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The explosion of the BP-leased Deepwater Horizon and subsequent oil spill stand as an 
indictment not just of our national energy priorities and environmental law enforcement; they 
equally represent a failure of Anglo-American corporate law and what passes for corporate 
social responsibility in business today.  Using BP and the disaster as a compelling case study, 
this Article examines green marketing and corporate governance and identifies elements of each 
that encourage firms to engage only superficially in corporate social responsibility yet trumpet 
those efforts to eager consumers and investors.  This Article then proposes reforms and 
protections designed to increase corporate social responsibility, root out greenwashing, and 
recognize liability for corporate social responsibility frauds on consumers and investors.  One of 
these protections derives from the newly enacted Dodd-Frank Act, whose Bureau of Consumer 
Financial Protection could play a leading role in policing fraudulent claims of corporate social 
responsibility. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 The BP oil spill represents a failure of more than just environ-
mental law and the functioning of government agencies charged with 
overseeing deepwater drilling;1 corporate law, corporate governance, 
and corporate social responsibility (CSR) doctrine are equally to blame 
for the unprecedented disaster.  Indeed, the spill implicates 
fundamental questions of how corporations are governed, how they 
present themselves to the public, and the goals they are supposed to 
achieve. 
 The tragic explosion and oil spill revealed a corporate culture at 
BP that had consistently neglected worker safety and environmental 
standards.  BP had a dismal safety record, with many accidents that 
could have been avoided through better equipment maintenance and 
increased precautions.2  Ironically, the company at the same time 
mounted a highly successful advertising campaign, portraying itself as 
environmentally friendly, or at the very least not as bad as other oil 
                                                 
 1. See Karla Urdaneta, Transboundary Petroleum Reservoirs:  A Recommended 
Approach for the United States and Mexico in the Deepwaters of the Gulf of Mexico, 32 
HOUS. J. INT’L L. 333, 346 n.52 (2010) (describing the regulatory role of the Minerals 
Management Service in deepwater exploration).  See generally Rachael E. Salcido, Offshore 
Federalism and Ocean Industrialization, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1355 (2008) (providing an account 
of conflicting structures of regulation of offshore activities). 
 2. See infra Part II.B. 
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companies, and a champion of environmental causes.3  The marketing 
worked perfectly:  BP went from a staid middle-of-the-pack oil 
company to one that consistently ranked in the top-ten most profitable 
multinational corporations in the world.  It even ranked highly for its 
treatment of employees and became a darling of corporate social 
responsibility advocates.4 
 This Article examines this glaring inconsistency:  the disconnect 
between how BP portrayed itself in the public sphere and how it 
actually behaved when its image was not at stake.  It is a fascinating 
case study in that BP’s advertising image was so strikingly different 
from the harsh realities of its environmental and safety record.  It 
seems that BP’s benevolence was limited primarily to areas that would 
be profitable for the firm’s shareholders; it did not engage in CSR 
beyond that level and importantly did not act in socially responsible 
ways where there would be no profit or public relations upside. 
 Part of the problem lies in what some term “greenwashing” and 
what we dub “faux CSR.”  By greenwashing, a corporation might 
increase its sales or boost its brand image through environmental 
rhetoric, but at the same time either pollute the environment or decline 
to spend money on the environment, employee welfare, or otherwise 
honor its commitments to other constituencies.5  CSR’s detractors 
                                                 
 3. See Helene Cooper & John M. Broder, BP’s Ties to Agency Are Long and 
Complex, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2010, at A14 (noting that in 2007 BP had provided Lawrence 
Berkeley National Laboratory with a $500 million grant to develop alternative energy 
sources; the recipient of the grant, Dr. Steven Chu, is now President Obama’s energy 
secretary); Joe Stephens, Oil Spill Threatens To Stain Alliances; Environmental Nonprofits 
Face Potential Backlash as Supporters Learn of Ties to BP, WASH. POST, May 24, 2010, at A1 
(detailing contributions from BP to nonprofit Nature Conservancy, and noting that “BP has 
been a major contributor to a Conservancy project aimed at protecting Bolivian forests”); id. 
(“In 2006, BP gave the organization 655 acres in York County, Va., where a state wildlife 
management area is planned.  In Colorado and Wyoming, the Conservancy has worked with 
BP to limit environmental damage from natural gas drilling.”). 
 4. According to the Wall Street Journal :  
BP . . . is now watching the halo created by a decade of smart advertising vanish as 
a mammoth oil slick makes its way across the Gulf of Mexico.  BP’s ‘Beyond 
Petroleum’ campaign had positioned the company on the green side of energy 
development.  But its sunken drilling platform—and the resulting environmental 
catastrophe—has sent it firmly back into dirty carbon company territory. 
Peter D. Hart & Dan McGinn, Advice for BP’s Reputation Crisis, WALL ST. J., May 27, 2010, 
at A19.  BP has indeed fallen from grace as a result of the oil spill, garnering a “devastating 
4-to-1 negative-to-positive ratio on feelings about the company.”  Id.; Ron Lieber, Driving 
Past the BP Station, and Tilting at Windmills, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2010, at B1 (noting 
consumer boycotts of BP gas stations). 
 5. See, e.g., Tom Wright, False “Green” Ads Draw Global Scrutiny, WALL ST. J., Jan. 
30, 2008, at B4.  But see Lisa M. Fairfax, Easier Said Than Done?  A Corporate Law Theory 
for Actualizing Social Responsibility Rhetoric, 59 FLA. L. REV. 771, 795-96 (2007) (arguing 
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come from all corners:  those on the right claim that businesses should 
stick to core efficiencies and guarantee shareholder returns;6 and those 
on the left argue that CSR is an ineffective half-measure that will co-
opt any long-lasting or meaningful social change.7  But critics of CSR, 
both from the right and from the left, agree that greenwashing poses 
problems for consumers, investors, and businesses, and that there 
currently are no ready solutions for policing CSR claims.8  We posit 
that the accuracy of CSR information is important for efficient 
securities markets and informed consumer choice.  Further, if faux 
CSR is allowed to flourish, it will ultimately undermine any attempts 
at substantive CSR, which will only be met with cynicism. 
 This Article therefore explores the ways in which corporate law 
doctrine could better serve companies wishing to become more 
socially responsible.  In doing so, we join the ranks of previous 
commentators who have advocated for more comprehensive and 
substantive standards for CSR programs.9  We suggest a number of 
possibilities to achieve this goal, including:  private standard-setting by 
independent organizations or other watchdogs; remedies under false 
advertising laws; claims under the securities fraud laws; and the newly 
                                                                                                             
provocatively and interestingly, based on psychological research, that corporations are more 
likely to “buy in” to CSR philosophies the more the rhetoric is repeated). 
 6. See Alan C. Neal, Corporate Social Responsibility:  Governance Gain or Laissez-
Faire Figleaf?, 29 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 459, 464 (2008) (providing big picture overview 
of the debate regarding CSR). 
 7. See, e.g., Kellye Y. Testy, Linking Progressive Corporate Law with Progressive 
Social Movements, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1227, 1229-30 (2002) (quoting feminist theorist Audre 
Lorde and arguing that the use of private ordering in this context may not provide a radical 
enough change). 
 8. Several articles detail the history of the CSR movement at some length.  See, e.g., 
Douglas M. Branson, Corporate Governance “Reform” and the New Corporate Social 
Responsibility, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 605 (2001); Richard Marens, The Hollowing Out of 
Corporate Social Responsibility:  Abandoning a Tradition in an Age of Declining Hegemony, 
39 MCGEORGE L. REV. 851 (2008); Joe W. (Chip) Pitts III, Corporate Social Responsibility:  
Current Status and Future Evolution, 6 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 334 (2009); Judd F. 
Sneirson, Doing Well by Doing Good:  Leveraging Due Care for Better, More Socially 
Responsible Corporate Decisionmaking, 3 CORP. GOVERNANCE L. REV. 438, 444-50 (2007); 
C.A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibility:  An Historical 
Retrospective for the Twenty-First Century, 51 KAN. L. REV. 77 (2002). 
 9. See Janet E. Kerr, The Creative Capitalism Spectrum:  Evaluating Corporate 
Social Responsibility Through a Legal Lens, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 831 (2008); Michael R. 
Siebecker, Corporate Speech, Securities Regulation, and an Institutional Approach to the First 
Amendment, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 613 (2006); Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and 
Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1199, 1293-
1306 (1999) (proposing that the SEC mandates disclosure of environmental information, thus 
providing a check against inflated advertising claims). 
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established Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, which could 
play a major role in policing CSR claims. 
 In the first half of this Article, we define and explore the reality 
versus the myth of BP.  Part II describes the reality, providing an 
overview of the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico and discussing the 
history of safety violations at BP, including recent incidents in Alaska, 
and the explosion of the Texas City, Texas, refinery that killed fifteen 
workers and that resulted in a massive fine from the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA).  In Part III, we turn to the 
myth—the “Beyond Petroleum” marketing campaign, and the CSR 
rhetoric from Lord John Browne, BP’s former CEO who spearheaded 
the advertisements.  Our goal is to provide the facts that dramatically 
illustrate the problem:  that a company can claim to be socially 
responsible, convince many people to believe and rely upon that claim, 
and yet act in a way that is anything but socially responsible. 
 Having described the problem in detail, we turn in Part IV to its 
causes and potential solutions.  After describing CSR in general terms 
and noting the various levels at which firms may practice it, we 
analyze the corporate law features that contributed to the discrepancy 
between BP’s advertising and reality.  Chief among them is the drive to 
maximize shareholder profits, which can lead to corporate decisions to 
skimp on safety to save time and money and flout laws and 
regulations.  Part IV also challenges this premise, arguing that 
American and British corporate laws do not require such a shareholder 
focus. 
 In Part V, we envision how the BP case study could be used as an 
opportunity for better corporate governance.  Current law, by focusing 
only on short-term shareholder value, validates a very surface or 
shallow view of CSR, in which acts with positive externalities are 
undertaken only for their advertising potential.  Instead we believe that 
additional policing of CSR is needed.  Some commentators have 
advocated for more complete disclosure of environment-related 
performance, while others have argued for expanded causes of action 
for either false advertising (for consumers) or securities fraud (for 
investors).  Another promising avenue that we explore rests with the 
newly created Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection.  Created by 
the Dodd-Frank Act in the summer of 2010, the agency’s enabling 
statute contains a specific charge to educate investors about the 
financial products they purchase; such language may provide another 
strategy for policing faux CSR claims. 
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II. THE REALITY:  AN OVERVIEW OF THE BP DISASTER 
 During the summer of 2010, live television footage showing oil 
gushing into the Gulf of Mexico became all too tragically familiar to 
the American public.10  In the days, weeks, and months following the 
Deepwater Horizon explosion,11 a more complete description of what 
happened unfolded in the mainstream media.  In this Part, we provide 
a brief factual overview of the disaster and BP’s subsequent attempts to 
stop oil from flowing into the Gulf.  From there, we turn to BP’s record 
of environmental and worker safety, which was unfortunately lacking. 
A. The Deepwater Horizon Explosion 
 On April 20, 2010, the Deepwater Horizon, a drilling rig owned 
by Transocean and leased by BP to explore the Macondo oil field, 
exploded, caught fire, and sank.  The accident killed eleven workers, 
while the others on the rig were saved by a supply ship; the attached 
well began to spew oil into the Gulf at an alarming rate.12  Although the 
causes of the disaster are still under investigation,13 BP initially blamed 
Transocean; Transocean blamed Cameron, a company that 
manufactured a valve in the malfunctioning blowout preventer,14 in 
                                                 
 10. Hank Stuever, BP Presents:  One Slick Horror Film, WASH. POST, May 26, 2010, 
at C1 (“Spillcam combines the dread of horror films with the monotony of Andy Warhol’s 
eight-hour silent movie of the Empire State Building.  There is no sound and nothing 
happens, except the inexorable, unending flow.  You watch a little, and then a little more, and 
then you can’t stop watching as a steady plume of dark brown oil belches upward from the 
floodlit, rocky ocean floor. . . .  The angle occasionally changes but the focus is always the 
leak.”). 
 11. There does not seem to be a consensus on what to call the oil spill.  The news 
media has used the terms “Deepwater Horizon Spill,” “The Gulf Oil Spill,” and “BP Oil 
Spill.”  Paul Farhi, The Branding of the Gulf Coast Oil Spill Could Be an Epic Problem for 
BP, WASH. POST, May 6, 2010, at C1.  We use the various names interchangeably throughout 
this Article. 
 12. Russell Gold, Guy Chazan & Ben Casselman, Oil Spills into Gulf After Rig 
Disaster, WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 2010, at A4; Steven Mufson & David A. Fahrenthold, Oil 
Executives Pass the Blame for Spill, WASH. POST, May 12, 2010, at A6 (noting details of the 
rescue of the workers). 
 13. Ben Casselman & Russell Gold, Unusual Decisions Set Stage for BP Disaster, 
WALL ST. J., May 27, 2010, at A1 (describing series of events and decisions that led up to the 
explosion). 
 14. In congressional testimony, BP officials admitted that one of the control pods for 
the blowout preventer had dead batteries.  See Steven Mufson & Joel Achenbach, BP Inserts 
Tube, Diverts Some Oil, WASH. POST, May 17, 2010, at A1.  In a letter written by Transocean 
and signed by a BP representative, BP agreed to a replacement of a key part of the blowout 
preventer, even though “doing so would reduce redundancies and increase risks on the 
drilling rig.”  Steven Mufson, BP Agreed in 2004 to Parts Changes on Drilling Rig, Letter 
Says, WASH. POST, May 23, 2010, at A4. 
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addition to Halliburton, which a day earlier had pumped concrete into 
the well.15  Representatives Henry Waxman and Bart Stupak asserted 
that BP compromised safety in order to reduce the amount of time and 
money it spent excavating the well.16  Others have blamed the Interior 
Department’s Minerals Management Service for merely rubber-
stamping BP’s drilling projects17 and failing to require that BP have an 
                                                                                                             
In an article in the November-December 2006 issue of Drilling Contractor, Gary 
Leach of Transocean and Bob Judge, chief engineer of Hydril, a GE unit that 
makes blowout preventers, said ‘substantial savings’ were possible by leaving a test 
valve on the blowout preventer and turning it upside down to avoid having to 
withdraw pipe for testing.  They said companies could save 12.5 hours or $260,000 
of rig time with each test. 
Steven Mufson, High Drilling Costs for Deepwater Horizon Pressured BP To Save Time, 
WASH. POST, May 28, 2010, at A8.  A federal investigation conducted by the U.S. Coast 
Guard and the Bureau of Ocean Energy Regulation and Enforcement heard testimony that 
“workers detected a leak in the hydraulic system that controls the blowout preventer” and 
reported it to BP management in Houston, but that the information never made it into 
required reports that BP sent to the Minerals Management Service.  Ben Casselman, 
Supervisor Says Flaw Was Found in Key Safety Device, WALL ST. J., July 21, 2010, at A7. 
 15. Dana Milbank, BP Needs a Crude Awakening, WASH. POST, May 12, 2010, at A2 
(“In a pair of Senate hearings Tuesday, BP’s McKay traded blame with the oil platform 
operator, Transocean, and drilling contractor Halliburton.  Their finger-pointing led one 
senator to compare them to children blaming one another for the baseball that went through 
the neighbor’s window.”); Steven Mufson & Michael D. Shear, Pressure Grows for Action by 
BP, WASH. POST, May 1, 2010, at A1. 
 16. Neil King Jr. & Russell Gold, BP Crew Focused on Costs:  Congress, WALL ST. J., 
June 15, 2010, at A1 (“Time after time, it appears that BP made decisions that increased the 
risk of a blowout to save the company time or expense.” (quoting letter from Reps. Waxman 
and Stupak)).  Congressional hearings have also noted that there was an alarm system in 
place, but that it had apparently been disabled because the company did not want anyone to 
be disturbed by false alarms.  Russell Gold & Ben Casselman, Alarm Was Disabled Before 
BP Blast, WALL ST. J., July 24, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487032 
94904575385160342490350.html.  In addition, congressional investigators found that BP 
had chosen a riskier well design, the “long string” design, which was less costly than the 
alternative liner-tieback design.  Russell Gold & Tom McGinty, BP Relied on Cheaper 
Wells—Analysis Shows Oil Giant Used “Risky” Design More Often Than Most Peers, WALL 
ST. J., June 19-20, 2010, at A1. 
 17. MMS has now been renamed the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management 
Regulation and Enforcement, and it would seem that, under its new director, the troubled 
agency is attempting to make a fresh start.  Many of the agency workers were formerly 
employed in the oil and gas industries, and there were charges of agency capture, or to put it 
more colorfully, that the agency is “in bed” with the industry.  MMS employees were, in fact, 
accused of literally being in bed with oil industry executives, as the Interior Department’s 
Inspector General found a culture of ethical failure exemplified by the Lakewood Colorado 
sex scandal.  See, e.g., Tom LoBianco, Bromwich Vows To Root Out and Fire Interior 
Workers Too Close to Industry, INSIDE ENERGY WITH FEDERAL LANDS No. 4 (June 28, 2010), 
available at 2010 WNLR 13960331.  Later investigation revealed that only a week before the 
explosion, BP had three rapid-fire filings changing the proposed method of drilling with 
MMS.  These revisions were approved quickly, one within five minutes of submission to 
Minerals Management Service.  Russell Gold, Ben Casselman & Maurice Tamman, Permit 
Snafus on BP’s Oil Well, WALL ST. J., June 1, 2010, at A1.  Further, these changes were 
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appropriate response plan in place in the event of a spill.18  The 
congressional investigation found that BP officials had chosen the 
riskier type of well casing only days before the blowout.19  An internal 
BP document “highlights a series of abnormal indicators—about 
pipeline pressure and the flow of drilling fluids in the five hours before 
the explosion—that should have been ‘warning signs’ of trouble.”20  A 
federal investigation has turned up five other problems on the rig, 
including repeated losses of power and the malfunctioning of a key 
computer used to monitor drilling operations.21  All five of the 
problems had a common link in that they involved “bad decisions, 
missed warnings and worker disagreements.”22 
 The severity of the incident was initially unclear.  As the days 
passed, and it became more obvious that a major spill was underway, 
BP CEO Tony Hayward flew to the Gulf of Mexico to inspect the 
damage.23  In the immediate aftermath of the explosion, BP estimated 
that approximately 1000 barrels of oil were leaking into the Gulf of 
Mexico per day.  BP’s initial estimates of the cost of cleanup, while 
still high, numbered in the low hundreds of millions of dollars.24  In 
fact, CEO Hayward further declared that the magnitude of the spill 
was “modest” compared to the size of the ocean.25  With hindsight, it 
now appears that everyone—from BP to the Coast Guard to the 
                                                                                                             
riskier, since they advocated using only one pipe instead of two.  Two pipes would provide an 
extra layer of protection.  However, using one pipe was “easier and faster, likely taking a 
week less time than the two-pipe method.”  Id. 
 18. Juliet Eilperin, U.S. Exempted BP Rigs from Impact Analysis, WASH. POST, May 
5, 2010, at A4. 
 19. Ian Urbina, BP Officials Took a Riskier Option for Well Casing, N.Y. TIMES, May 
27, 2010, at A1. 
 20. Russell Gold & Neil King Jr., BP Ignored Signs of Danger in Well, WALL ST. J., 
May 13, 2010, at A6; Steven Mufson, BP’s Investigation Finds Unheeded ‘Warning Signs,’ 
WASH. POST, May 26, 2010, at A7; Stephen Power, BP Cites Crucial ‘Mistake’—‘Very Large 
Abnormality’ in the Well Wasn’t Heeded Hours Before Fatal Explosion, WALL ST. J., May 26, 
2010, at A1. 
 21. Ben Casselman, Susan Daker & Angel Gonzales, BP Weighs New Way To Plug 
the Well, WALL ST. J., July 20, 2010, at A6. 
 22. Russell Gold, Rig’s Final Hours Probed, WALL ST. J., July 19, 2010, at A1. 
 23. In retrospect, Hayward’s comments seem almost hubristic.  He dismissed 
comparisons with the Exxon Valdez spill, noting, “The issue with the Valdez is that it took a 
long time to get the resources in place . . . .  We’ve got enormous resources in place, and 
we’re hitting it with everything we’ve got.”  Guy Chazan, BP’s Escalating Costs Put Investors 
on Edge, WALL ST. J., May 1-2, 2010, at A4. 
 24. Clifford Krauss, Oil Spill’s Blow to BP’s Image May Eclipse Out-of-Pocket 
Costs, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2010, at B1 (providing estimate from BP that the cost of the 
cleanup would only be several hundred million dollars). 
 25. Steven Pearlstein, For All Its Blunders, BP Didn’t Cut and Run, WASH. POST, May 
28, 2010, at A18. 
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mainstream news media—underestimated the extent of the spill.26  
Some accused BP of deliberately obfuscating the extent of the spill 
and interfering with scientists who were trying to estimate the extent of 
the damage.27 
 As the estimates of leaking oil were steadily revised upward—
from 5000 barrels a day to 20,000 barrels a day to the alarming figures 
of 40,000 to 60,000 barrels a day—public pressure mounted to stanch 
the flow before marine life was damaged and the Gulf coastline was 
irretrievably despoiled.28  Building a relief well was estimated to take 
three months, which meant that the oil would continue to spill through 
the entire summer.29  In the meantime, BP tried a containment dome;30 
                                                 
 26. Campbell Robertson & Eric Lipton, Government Criticizes BP for Response to 
Oil Spill, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2010, at A1 (“Rear Adm. Mary E. Landry, the chief Coast 
Guard official in charge of the response, said on April 22, after the rig sank, that the oil that 
was on the surface appeared to be merely residual oil from the fire, though she said it was 
unclear what was going on underwater.  The day after, officials said that it appeared the well’s 
blowout preventer had kicked in and that there did not seem to be any oil leaking from the 
well, though they cautioned it was not a guarantee.”); Julia Werdigier, Rising Oil Price 
Benefits BP Earnings, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2010, at A16 (“[T]he accident is unlikely to hurt 
BP’s production because the deposit at the rig was relatively small.”). 
 27. A blog post by author John Robb recently explored this hypothesis.  John Robb, 
No More Katrinas?, GLOBAL GUERRILLAS (May 30, 2010, 6:26 AM), http://globalguerrillas. 
typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2010/05/journal-no-more-katrinas.html. 
 28. The amount spilled is vitally important because criminal penalties for the 
pollution are calculated per barrel.  See Sam Dolnick & Liz Robins, BP Says One Oil Leak 
of Three Is Shut Off, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/06/us/ 
06spill.html (“[A] senior BP executive conceded . . . that the ruptured oil well could 
conceivably spill as much as 60,000 barrels a day of oil, more than 10 times the estimate of 
the current flow.”); Stephen Power, John Kell & Siobhan Hughes, BP, Oil Industry Take Fire 
at Hearing:  Scientists Raise Estimate of Leak to Up to 60,000 Barrels a Day, Raising Fresh 
Questions About Containment Plans, WALL ST. J., June 16, 2010, at A5; see also Joel 
Achenbach, 5,000 or 26,000 Barrels a Day:  Size of Spill a Guesstimate, WASH. POST, May 
14, 2010, at A6 (noting that at first BP did not want to measure the extent of the spill); David 
A. Fahrenthold & Joel Achenbach, Heavy Oil Reaches La. Marshland, WASH. POST, May 19, 
2010, at A4 (“Officials had first estimated the leak at 5,000 barrels a day, but outside experts 
have said it appears much larger than that.”); Kimberly Kindy, BP Falling Far Short of Claims 
on Oil Removal, WASH. POST, July 6, 2010, at A1 (“In late May, a group of scientists charged 
by the government with estimating the flow said the rate was 12,000 to 25,000 barrels a day.  
And in June, the official estimated rate jumped to 35,000 to 60,000 barrels a day.”); Steven 
Mufson & David Fahrenthold, Federal Officials Say Oil Is Gushing Faster than Thought, 
WASH. POST, May 21, 2010, at A6 (“One month after the start of a massive oil spill in the 
Gulf of Mexico, federal officials said . . . that oil was gushing out of the ground faster than 
they had estimated—and that it would be days before they had a firm handle on the rate.”). 
 29. Ben Casselman, Stephen Power & Ana Campoy, Oil-Spill Fight Bogs Down, 
WALL ST. J., May 1-2, 2010, at A1. 
 30. Steven Mufson & Mark Kaufman, Oil Spill Gushes on Amid Technical Problems, 
WASH. POST, May 9, 2010, at A5 (reporting failure of containment dome due to the formation 
of ice-like crystals); Ian Urbina, Justin Gillis & Clifford Krauss, On Defensive, BP Tests 
Ideas To Stem Leaks, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2010, at A1. 
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a capping device imaginatively named a “top hat”;31 a “top kill” 
maneuver, using liquids to push the oil back down the well;32 a junk 
shot, which tried to plug the hole with smaller material;33 and a tube to 
capture the oil.34  Unfortunately, these efforts either failed completely 
or made little impact.35 
 As BP’s repeated attempts to stop the spill failed, local, state, and 
federal officials found themselves under increasing pressure from the 
public.36  It was unclear, however, what the government could do, since 
BP had the on-ground engineering expertise and was also providing 
the funding for the operations.37  As days turned into weeks, the Obama 
administration came under fire for mishandling the spill, and President 
Obama changed his tone from one of cooperation to one that was 
increasingly bellicose, capped by his comment that he was not 
studying the problem out of a detached academic interest, but rather 
because he needed to know “whose ass to kick.”38  Meanwhile, 
Hayward had to admit that BP should have been more prepared for 
such an emergency, admitting that “[i]t’s clear that we will find things 
we can do differently, capability that we could have available to deploy 
instantly, rather than be creating it as we go.”39 
                                                 
 31. Brian Baskin, BP Tries Again To Halt Spewing Oil, WALL ST. J., May 13, 2010, at 
A6 (describing the containment box known as a “top hat”); Henry Fountain & Matthew L. 
Wald, BP Says Leak May Be Closer to a Solution, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2010, at A1 (same). 
 32. Clifford Krauss & John M. Broder, After Delay, BP Resumes Effort To Plug Oil 
Leak, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2010, at A1. 
 33. Clifford Krauss & Jackie Calmes, Little Headway as BP Struggles To Halt Oil 
Leak, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2010, at A1. 
 34. Joel Achenbach & Juliet Eilperin, BP Fails in Its Latest Attempt To Contain Oil, 
WASH. POST, May 16, 2010, at A6. 
 35. Leslie Kaufman & Clifford Krauss, BP Says Its Latest Effort To Stop Gulf Leak 
Failed, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2010, at A1. 
 36. Karen Tumulty & Steven Mufson, Administration Torn on Getting Tough with 
BP, WASH. POST, May 25, 2010, at A1. 
 37. Juliet Eilperin, Crisis Forces Government, BP To Work Together, WASH. POST, 
May 14, 2010, at A6; Jonathan Weisman & Jeffrey Ball, U.S. Turns Up Heat on BP, WALL ST. 
J., May 25, 2010, at A1 (“While some critics have asked why the White House doesn’t take 
control of the cleanup, Coast Guard Admiral Thad Allen, speaking at the White House 
Monday, said he wouldn’t recommend it.  He said the government doesn’t have more 
technology or expertise than the oil giant to deal with the leaking well, anyway.”). 
 38. Justin Gillis & Henry Fountain, Rate of Oil Leak, Still Not Clear, Puts Doubt on 
BP, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2010, at A1 (“‘I don’t sit around just talking to experts because this is 
a college seminar’ . . . .  ‘We talk to these folks because they potentially have the best answer 
so I know whose ass to kick.’” (quoting President Obama)); see also Michael Cooper, Obama 
Warns BP on Paying Big Dividends Amid Oil Spill, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2010, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/05/us/politics/05obama.html (noting tough talk from 
President Obama). 
 39. Guy Chazan & Jim Carlton, BP Wasn’t Prepared for Leak, CEO Says, WALL ST. 
J., May 14, 2010, at A5 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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 Government officials were especially concerned with who would 
pay for the cleanup, and were alarmed at the prospect that the 
taxpayers might find themselves saddled with that responsibility.  The 
news media buzzed with discussion of BP’s attempt to shift liability 
onto Transocean and concern that there might not be enough money 
available for a thorough cleanup.40  Under a law passed in the aftermath 
of the Exxon Valdez disaster, liability for oil spills was limited to a 
mere $75 million, plus cleanup costs, which seemed woefully 
inadequate.41  That liability limitation, however, would not apply if 
there was “gross negligence” or criminal action, which could result in 
the imposition of high fines.42  BP was criticized for not doing enough 
to stop the continuing spill, and Hayward fanned the flames of 
resentment with his statement that he would “like his life back.”43 
 In the middle of June, the government and BP announced that a 
settlement—outside the typical legal processes—had been reached.44  
BP agreed to pay $20 billion to a general-purpose fund that would 
cover costs of the cleanup and provide reimbursement to those Gulf 
residents whose lives had been affected.45  While claimants could opt 
out of the claims process and file in court, the fund promised to be a 
more efficient and ready route to obtain payment.  Those who were 
making claims would not hire attorneys, which cut down on 
                                                 
 40. Thomas Catan & Dionne Searcey, Dispute Rages on BP Liability for Wages, as 
Obama Pushes, WALL ST. J., June 11, 2010, at A6; Guy Chazan & Stephen Power, U.S. 
Ramps Up Tab on BP—Stock Plunges as White House Insists Company Pay All Idled Oil 
Workers in Gulf, WALL ST. J., June 10, 2010, at A1. 
 41. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (2006); see also William W. 
Enders, The Oil Pollution Act of 1990:  The Financial Responsibility Requirement—
Questioning Congressional Intent and the Minerals Management Service Interpretation of 
“Offshore Facility,” 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 455, 460-61 (1995); Neil King Jr. & Guy Chazan, 
Effort To Raise BP’s Liability Cap Gains Momentum, WALL ST. J., May 6, 2010, at A5. 
 42. Steven Mufson & Theresa Vargas, As Outcry Grows, Investors Batter BP, WASH. 
POST, June 2, 2010, at A1. 
 43. Jad Mouawad & Clifford Krauss, Another Torrent BP Works To Stem:  Its 
C.E.O., N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2010, at A1; Eugene Robinson, At BP, Firing Offenses, WASH. 
POST, June 4, 2010, at A19.  Hayward later infuriated the public further when it was revealed 
that he had taken time off to watch his yacht compete in a race around England’s waters.  BP’s 
Hayward Blasted for Taking in Yacht Race, WASH. POST, June 20, 2010, at A2; Liz Robbins, 
Embattled BP Chief Takes in Yacht Race, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2010, at A20. 
 44. Jonathan Weisman & Guy Chazan, BP Agrees to $20 Billion Fund, WALL ST. J., 
June 17, 2010, at A1. 
 45. Steven Mufson, BP Details Plan for $20 Billion Claim Fund, WASH. POST, June 
17, 2010, at A8.  To pay for the fund, BP is selling oil and gas assets, cutting spending, and 
suspending a planned dividend.  Guy Chazan & Gina Chon, BP Sells $7 Billion of Assets To 
Help Fund Cleanup, WALL ST. J., July 21, 2010, at A7. 
 
 
 
 
994 TULANE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:983 
 
transaction costs.46  Kenneth Feinberg—who previously administered 
the September 11th fund to assist those affected by the terrorist attacks 
on the World Trade Center and also served as Obama’s “Pay Czar” 
overseeing executive compensation at the companies that received 
TARP government bailout money—was named the head of the relief 
fund.47 
 On July 15, 2010, eighty-five days after the Deepwater Horizon 
explosion, BP announced that it had found a temporary solution in a 
tightly fitted cap, which successfully contained the leaking oil.48  
During the spill, Gulf residents continuously lamented the lack of 
skimmers available to collect the oil before it reached shore.  
Thousands whose livelihood depended on tourism or on harvesting 
marine life remain unemployed.49  Hurricane Katrina had already 
scarred the area, and the oil spill struck a second devastating economic 
blow.  No one is sure of the extent of the environmental damage, or 
how long it will take to clean the area of the spilled oil.50  The federal 
government officially declared the Macondo well “dead” on 
September 21, 2010.  It may be years, if not decades, before the 
damage is remediated.51 
                                                 
 46. The claims process, however, still has some contentious debates.  For example, a 
number of fishermen are frustrated that any money they make skimming oil in the cleanup 
efforts is being subtracted from the amount of their claim against the settlement fund.  Under 
that type of process, it actually is more economically efficient for a vessel to sit idle than to 
participate in the cleanup effort.  See Matthew Bigg, Gulf Coast Fishermen Angry over Oil 
Claims Ruling, REUTERS, July 17, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE66F 
64J20100717. 
 47. Ed O’Keefe, Obama’s ‘Pay Czar’ To Oversee BP Victims’ Fund, WASH. POST, 
June 17, 2010, at A19; Scott Wilson & Joel Achenbach, BP Agrees to $20 Billion Fund for 
Gulf Claims, WASH. POST, June 17, 2010, at A1.  Of course, criminal fines and other costs 
associated with the spill could amount to far more than the amount in the fund, and as there 
was no absolution from that liability, BP presumably will have to pay more than the amount 
that was put into escrow.  John Schwartz, Costs to BP Would Soar Under Criminal Charges, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2010, at A18 (estimating BP’s liability to be $62.9 billion in total). 
 48. Susan Daker & Russell Gold, Oil Spill Halts, for Now, as BP Tests Out New Cap, 
WALL ST. J., July 16, 2010, at A1.  However, there is a continuing concern that the oil might 
begin leaking again from the sides, as the cap is only a temporary measure.  Casselman, 
Daker & Gonzales, supra note 21, at A6. 
 49. Russell Adams & Justin Lahart, Locals Grapple with Road to Recovery, WALL 
ST. J., July 19, 2010, at A4. 
 50. Jeffrey Ball, Early Look at Ecological Toll Is Alarming, Scientists Say, WALL ST. 
J., July 19, 2010, at A4. 
 51. A recent article asked many difficult questions left in the aftermath of the spill.  
Allen G. Breed & Vicki Smith, Residents Struggle with Work Options, ASSOCIATED PRESS, 
July 19, 2010, available at http://www.2theadvocate.com/news/98721704.html?c= 
1288239023809 (“Which species will rebound, and which have been pushed beyond the 
brink? Has the oil accelerated the die-off of marshlands that protect one of America’s great 
cities and make this the nation’s second-most-productive fishing region?”). 
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B. Safety Violations 
 Long before the Deepwater Horizon explosion, BP had a 
troubling record of noncompliance with environmental regulations and 
worker safety.  Iain Conn, BP’s head of refining and marketing, 
admitted in a recent interview that the company had “a lot to prove 
. . . .  A bad track record leaves you with a long shadow, and we have to 
deal with that.”52  Others in the industry noticed that after its strategic 
acquisitions in the beginning of the last decade, costs were cut by 
firing the engineers with the most experience, which perhaps was not 
the best decision from a safety perspective.53  When Hayward took the 
helm as CEO, he noted that he would make safety the first priority of 
the company and would focus on it like a “laser.”54  The record reflects, 
however, that there were numerous safety problems after the shift to 
Hayward’s leadership and ostensible commitment to safety concerns.55 
 Although Hayward said he was committed to creating a new 
system of safety standards, it was impeded due to a “shortage of 
experienced offshore workers” and a lack of training to “maintain safe, 
reliable and efficient operations.”56  According to an internal BP report 
in 2007, which detailed ten near-miss incidents in the Gulf of Mexico, 
a “common theme . . . was a failure to follow BP’s own procedures and 
an unwillingness to stop work when something was wrong.”57  Further, 
in 2007 alone, BP paid $373 million in settling lawsuits that arose 
from the Texas City refinery explosion, oil spills along BP’s pipeline in 
Alaska, and the allegation that BP traders were manipulating the 
market for propane.58  We will discuss the various safety problems at 
BP as they arose chronologically, to show how BP’s reality was far 
different from the green myth they sought to convey. 
 In 2002, California officials brought a lawsuit—which eventually 
settled for $100 million—alleging that BP falsified inspection reports 
                                                 
 52. Guy Chazan, BP Already in Safety Spotlight, WALL ST. J., Apr. 22, 2010, at A4 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 53. Joe Nocera, BP Ignored the Omens of Disaster, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2010, at B1 
(“Taking shortcuts was ingrained in the company’s culture, and everyone in the oil business 
knew it.”). 
 54. Guy Chazan, Benoit Faucon & Ben Casselman, Safety and Cost Drives Clashed 
as CEO Hayward Remade BP, WALL ST. J., June 30, 2010, at A1. 
 55. Id. (“‘[T]hey [BP] claim to be very much focused on safety, I think sincerely. . . .  
But somehow their sincerity and their programs don’t always get translated well into the 
refinery floor.’” (quoting OSHA inspector)). 
 56. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
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of fuel tanks at a refinery located in Los Angeles.59  Other problems 
with refineries had much more dire consequences for workers.  A 2005 
explosion at a refinery in Texas City, Texas, led to the death of fifteen 
workers and the injury of hundreds more.60  OSHA fined BP $87 
million for noncompliance with safety regulations arising from the 
Texas City explosion.  An investigation after the accident found that 
the routine maintenance that was necessary—and which would have 
prevented the accident—had not been performed because it was 
deemed too expensive.61  Criminal charges against BP were later 
settled for $370 million in fines, with a statement by BP that its 
operations “failed to meet [BP’s] own standards and the requirements 
of the law.”62  Also in 2005, Thunder Horse, one of BP’s developments 
in the Gulf of Mexico, severely listed after a hurricane.  Investigators, 
however, concluded—rather alarmingly—that this was the result of 
engineering problems and not the hurricane per se.63 
 In 2006, OSHA inspected a BP refinery in Toledo, Ohio, and 
found problems with pressure relief valves, which they instructed BP 
to remediate.64  When inspectors returned two years later, they found 
that the specific valves that had been noted in the report had been 
replaced, but not the same type of noncomplying valves that were 
located in other areas of the refinery.65  OSHA fined BP $3 million and 
ordered BP to fix all the remaining valves.66  While BP was perhaps 
meeting the letter of compliance, it was certainly not following the 
spirit of compliance. 
 Also in 2006, it was discovered that a portion of BP’s Alaska 
pipeline near Prudhoe Bay had repeatedly been leaking oil into the 
tundra due to pipe corrosion.67  Despite later replacement of certain 
pipes and installation of a leak detection system, the spills continued.  
In a court filing, the State of Alaska accused BP of “poor maintenance 
                                                 
 59. Abrahm Lustgarten & Ryan Knutson, BP Had a History of Problems—Internal 
Inquiries Show Firm Continued To Ignore Safety, Environmental Rules, WASH. POST, June 8, 
2010, at A1. 
 60. The workers apparently were contractors, not BP employees, but the company 
paid compensation to them regardless of status.  Tom Bower, Drilling Down:  A Troubled 
Legacy in Oil, WALL ST. J., May 1-2, 2010, at W3; Krauss, supra note 24. 
 61. Jad Mouawad, Fast-Growing BP Also Has a Mounting List of Spills and Safety 
Lapses, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2010, at A22. 
 62. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 63. Bower, supra note 60. 
 64. Chazan et al., supra note 54. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Bower, supra note 60. 
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practices” and alleged that a failure to maintain the pipeline properly 
had resulted in several recent spills.68  There had also been a rupture on 
a portion of a natural gas pipeline operated by BP, which could have 
resulted in a major disaster.  Apparently BP had not inspected or 
maintained the pipeline for over a decade before the rupture.69 
 An internal inquiry at BP after the Alaska spill came to some 
alarming conclusions.  The internal investigation found that the 
company had a “pattern of . . . intimidating workers who raised safety 
or environmental concerns.  It said managers shaved maintenance 
costs by using aging equipment for as long as possible.”70  The report 
also “quoted an employee who said employees felt forced to skip key 
diagnostics, including pressure testing, pipeline cleaning and corrosion 
checks.”71  The same news story also detailed the tale of one 
whistleblower who was summarily fired for expressing safety concerns 
when he attempted to report hazardous conditions on the pipeline—
conditions that could well have led to an explosion.72 
 On June 5, 2008, Atlantis Oil Platform, located in the Gulf of 
Mexico, suffered a ruptured piece of steel tubing.  The tubing was 
“attached to a defective pipeline pump that BP had put off repairing, in 
what an internal report later described as ‘the context of a tight cost 
budget.’”73  While only 193 barrels of oil were spilled, which certainly 
seems minor compared to the Deepwater Horizon disaster, the fact is 
that consistent delayed maintenance signaled a critical weakness in 
BP’s operations.  One reporter noted that “[a]s investigators were 
questioning Atlantis’ lean operation, top executives were praising it.”74  
In fact, according to an internal communication in 2009, Neil Shaw, 
who was head of BP’s Gulf of Mexico operations, “lauded Atlantis’ 
operating efficiency, saying it was ‘4% better than plan’ in its first year 
of production.”75  Although no major incidents had been reported in the 
Gulf, it seemed like it was only a matter of time before there was an 
incident.  According to an internal BP presentation, there were ten near 
                                                 
 68. Chazan et al., supra note 54. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Lustgarten & Knutson, supra note 59 (noting that the internal report, compiled 
with the assistance of the law firm Vinson & Elkins, contained a “harsh assessment of BP’s 
management of employee concerns” and that “[a]ccording to the report, workers accused the 
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misses in 2007 alone, and one in which a worker suffered an electric 
shock.76 
 In 2009, a repeat OSHA inspection back at the Texas City 
refinery unearthed even more troubling facts.  Safety violations, much 
like the ones that led to the 2005 explosion, abounded in the refinery.  
OSHA imposed the largest fine in the agency’s history, $87 million, 
much of which was for “failure to abate” the problems that had caused 
the previous explosion.77  A former employee, Ross MacFarlane, who 
was the health and safety manager on several BP rigs, claims that 
employees had “high incentive to find shortcuts and take risks . . . .  
You only ever got questioned about why you couldn’t spend less—
never more.”78 
 Later reports and investigations confirmed that numerous 
shortcuts were taken regarding the exploration of the Macondo oil 
field where the Deepwater Horizon rig was drilling.  Not only was the 
riskier type of single well casing used, but an email that was sent by an 
engineer only four days before the explosion noted that “engineers had 
not taken all the usual steps to center the steel pipe in the drill hole, a 
standard procedure designed to ensure that the pipe would be properly 
cemented in place.  ‘[W]ho cares, it’s done, end of story, will probably 
be fine and we’ll get a good cement job.’”79  Fewer devices were used 
to center the drill pipe in the well than the subcontractor, Halliburton, 
had recommended.  The recommended centralizers were not on-site, 
and it would have taken an additional ten hours to install them.80  In 
addition, BP did not circulate mud through the well before starting the 
cement fill—a technique recommended by the trade group, the 
American Petroleum Institute—or attempt a cement bond log, which 
would have tested the quality of the cement barrier.81  Some of the 
decisions violated industry standards and seemed to be taken even 
when there were warnings either from BP employees or 
subcontractors.82  The congressional report details many other 
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 77. Id. 
 78. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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instances in which BP compromised safety in the name of cost 
savings.83 
 From this factual account, we turn next to examining BP’s 
advertising and branding campaign, juxtaposing BP’s green myth with 
the factual reality we have just explored. 
III. THE MYTH:  BP’S HISTORY AND “BEYOND PETROLEUM” 
INITIATIVE 
 In the aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon tragedy, many of BP’s 
previous safety errors came to the public’s attention.  However, over 
the years, many of these safety issues were largely ignored; instead, BP 
had covered these safety problems by cultivating an image as a leader 
in CSR, a role that they spent $200 million in advertising to promote.  
We begin this Part by examining the history of the company, then turn 
to its “Beyond Petroleum” advertising campaign, and the timeline of 
how BP attempted to green its image in the earlier part of the decade.  
Finally, we end this Part by discussing the just-released memoirs of 
BP’s most recent former CEO, Lord John Browne, who led the effort 
to green the company’s image. 
A. History, Cast of Characters, and Corporate Culture 
 Originally known as the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, BP struck 
oil in 1908 in the area then known as Persia (modern day Iran).84  In the 
years immediately following the discovery, however, BP struggled, 
because there was difficulty finding a market for its products.85  At that 
time, automobiles were only a luxury product and the demand for oil, 
which was mostly put to industrial use, was largely met by small local 
producers. 
 The mass production of automobiles, the invention of the 
airplane, and the mobilization of troops during World War I, however, 
all led to a surge in the demand for oil.  While the British government 
did provide some investment capital to the company, the “BP” label 
actually came from a World War I nationalization of a German 
company that had used the name to distribute oil in the United 
                                                 
 83. Id.; Mufson & Kornblut, supra note 79. 
 84. This background historical information is taken largely from the official BP 
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Kingdom.86  During World War II, oil reserves once again played a 
vital strategic role in the conflict.  With the postwar British Empire 
crumbling, the company found itself pushed out of Persia.87  In 1954, 
the company officially changed its name to “The British Petroleum 
Company.”  The company, along with others, was eventually allowed to 
continue its extraction efforts in Iran.88  In subsequent years, BP made 
several major finds in different areas of the world, including Prudhoe 
Bay, Alaska.89 
 As Middle Eastern nations began nationalizing their oil fields, 
BP increasingly turned to offshore drilling in the United Kingdom and 
in Alaska.  In the 1970s, BP found itself in conflict with 
environmentalists regarding its Alaska pipeline.  In its official 
company history reprinted on its website, BP credits the Alaska 
pipeline battle as a lesson learned:  “From the protracted Alaskan 
debate BP took away a lesson about the value of dealing with 
potentially contentious environmental considerations at the very start 
of major projects.  More importantly BP found within itself a passion 
for confronting environmental challenges with ingenuity and 
determination.”90 
 In the late 1990s, then-CEO Lord John Browne was one of the 
first major oil company executives to acknowledge the existence of 
global climate change.  He also approved of the “Beyond Petroleum” 
advertising campaign.91  In essence, the idea was to market BP as an 
energy company that cared about finding renewable sources of power, 
not just the old-fashioned ways that “big oil” had operated in the past.  
During his tenure at BP, Lord Browne engaged in a series of strategic 
acquisitions.  BP purchased Amoco, a major player in American 
markets.  While the acquisition greatly expanded BP’s scope and reach 
as a company, observers questioned how successfully BP was able to 
integrate the former Amoco operations and personnel into its 
organization.  Others questioned whether staff redundancies resulted in 
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lower safety standards.92  The last few years of Browne’s tenure were 
problematic due to an explosion at the Texas City refinery, discussed 
below.  With his reputation already damaged by the Texas City refinery 
explosion, Browne was vulnerable, and other safety issues were on the 
horizon.  Although some dispute the reasons for his ouster, Lord 
Browne described his decision to resign as a response to a scandal 
about his personal life.93 
 Browne’s successor, Tony Hayward, backed off the “Beyond 
Petroleum” campaign, noting that BP’s core business was the 
extraction and distribution of oil.94  Trained as an engineer and 
geologist, Hayward had a “back to fundamentals” approach.  At the 
time, Hayward said, “The bit about ‘beyond petroleum’ being dead and 
buried is nonsense . . . . [I]t’s a business as opposed to an advertising 
slogan.”95  Although Hayward’s quote is rather enigmatic, it showcases 
the problematic relationship between the advertising campaign and 
BP’s corporate culture.  Further, Hayward led a cost-cutting drive that 
some argue “allowed the company to put more resources into 
operations, including safety.  Yet critics have asked whether the 
aggressive internal trimming also nurtured a culture of cutting 
corners.”96  During the crisis, Hayward came under attack for various 
gaffes, including the infamous comment that he would “like [his] life 
back” and his taking time off to attend a yacht race as the catastrophe 
in the Gulf continued to unfold.97  He also raised the ire of members of 
Congress when he seemed to evade their questions, and President 
Obama made it clear that if it were up to him, he would have fired 
Hayward long before for those mistakes.  At the end of July, the BP 
board announced that it was replacing Hayward with Robert Dudley, a 
U.S. citizen who spent his childhood in the Gulf region.98 
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B. The “Beyond Petroleum” Advertising Campaign 
 During the past decade, BP made a series of strategic branding 
decisions designed to green the company’s image.  First was a play on 
their acronym “BP,” claiming that their initials stood for “Beyond 
Petroleum.”99  The next group of advertisements suggested that BP was 
aware of various environmental issues and was willing not only to 
discuss them but also to start taking action.  Using the tagline “It’s a 
Start,” the advertisements noted that BP was making their operations 
more efficient and reducing overall carbon emissions in extracting 
petroleum.100  Further, they acknowledged the issues of global climate 
change and advocated that each person be aware of his or her “carbon 
footprint.”101 
 Other advertisements touted BP’s use of and investment in 
renewable sources of energy such as biofuels, wind, and solar energy.102  
In order to be successful long-term, the advertisements stated, an 
energy company would need to diversify the sources from which that 
energy came.103  The advertisements featured “man on the street” type 
interviews that asked average people what their thoughts were about 
global warming and other hot-button environmental issues. 
 Other strategic choices included the construction of the Helios 
House, an environmentally friendly gas station in Los Angeles, 
California.104  Helios House gas station featured solar panels on the 
roof, an ultramodern bathroom that was water efficient, and an 
abundance of plants to absorb carbon.  BP Magazine noted the fact 
                                                                                                             
Replaced, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 25, 2010, available at http://www.washington 
times.com/news/2010/jul/25/official-bp-ceo-hayward-being-replaced-over-spill/. 
 99. BP, Beyond Oil, YOUTUBE (Sept. 15, 2006), http://www.youtube.com/watch? 
v=8liOnfr2BjY.  BP also stands for Brown Pelican, the Louisiana state bird often 
photographed covered in oil in news accounts of the spill’s environmental damage. 
 100. BP, New Sources of Energy, YOUTUBE (Oct. 8, 2006), http://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=p9m7jo5I1GQ. 
 101. BP, Global Climate Change, YOUTUBE (Oct. 8, 2006), http://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=IZiEMKQMjzg; BP, Carbon Footprint, YOUTUBE (Dec. 10, 2008), http://www. 
youtube.com/watch?v=ywrZPypqSB4; see also BP, Carbon Footprint—What Is It? YOUTUBE 
(Jan. 15, 2007), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fk-oxSfAuOA. 
 102. BP, British Petroleum, YOUTUBE (Apr. 29, 2009), http://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=thXeYv-Zxr4; BP, BP Commercial, YOUTUBE (Jan. 4, 2009), http://www.youtube. 
com/watch?v=RrDiRgRuPMQ. 
 103. Alternative Energy, BP, http://www.bp.com/sectiongenericarticle.do?categoryId= 
9018233&contentId=7033043 (last visited Feb. 27, 2011). 
 104. A description of Helios House appears in a magazine that BP published to 
showcase its new advertising campaign and its stance toward innovation and environmental 
causes.  Lucy Harvey, Innovation on the Front Line, BP MAG., 2:2007, http://www.bp.com/ 
liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/reports_and_publications/bp_magazine/
STAGING/local_assets/pdf/bp_mag_issue_2_2007_retail_therapy.pdf. 
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that the gas station saved twenty percent of the power that the average 
gas station-convenience store combination would use.105  Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that many in Los Angeles were impressed with the 
Helios House and went out of their way to use the station as opposed 
to others because they liked the environmentally friendly message as 
well as the ultra-modern, green construction.106  Other environ-
mentalists—before the Gulf oil spill, of course—had recommended 
stopping to fill up at BP because of their reputation as a greener 
company.107 
 According to BP Magazine, company executives were hoping 
that the advertising campaign would have exactly that effect—that it 
would cause customers to go out of their way—or at least a block or 
two out of their way—to fuel their cars at a BP station.  It was a 
method of branding what was otherwise a highly price-dependent, 
fungible commodity.108  As Ann Hand, BP’s marketing chief, put it: 
With Helios House, we wanted to challenge the image of buying 
gasoline and see if our consumer brand could drive more shareholder 
value . . . .  Since it opened, the site has nearly doubled its fuel volumes, 
compared with its predecessor and it’s selling six times as much 
premium fuel. . . .  Consumers these days want it all, and their interest 
in the environment is at an all-time peak.  It is a perfect time for our 
unique brand to offer them a better guest experience and reinforce our 
values on the environment, climate change and sustainability.  We have 
a shareholder obligation to maximise value and increase sales revenue, 
but, at the same time, we can deliver great guest experience and build 
brand loyalty.  That creates a win-win situation for our consumers and 
our shareholders.109 
Hand’s explanation, taken directly from BP Magazine, describes the 
corporate philosophy at the time.  Or, as a recent Wall Street Journal 
article put it, BP had spent “hundreds of millions of dollars to build its 
image over the years using slogans such as ‘Beyond Petroleum,’ as it 
                                                 
 105. Id. 
 106. Telephone Interview with Anne Bloom, Visiting Professor of Law, Loyola Law 
School Los Angeles (July 10, 2010). 
 107. Brendan Borrell, Had Your Fill of BP?, WASH. POST, June 29, 2010, at E3 (noting 
that before the Deepwater Horizon spill, BP had been rated highly as an eco-friendly gas 
station choice). 
 108. Hart & McGinn, supra note 4 (noting that BP once enjoyed “the halo created by a 
decade of smart advertising” that had “positioned the company on the green side of energy 
development”). 
 109. Harvey, supra note 104, at 12 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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tried to position itself as the ‘greenest’ of the big oil companies.”110  
The strategy seemed to work, catapulting BP to the eighty-third largest 
company brand in the world.111 
C. Former BP CEO Lord John Browne’s Memoir 
 In recent years, numerous high-profile business executives have 
penned widely read autobiographical accounts.112  In these memoirs, 
former business leaders recount high-pressure deals and significant 
strategic choices while providing insight into the attitudes and work 
ethic that led to their successes.113  Much like the stories of historical, 
political, or spiritual leaders, executives’ stories show that the 
individual may have a significant impact on the way that a particular 
type of collective social organization—in this instance, a business—
carries out its policies and goals. 
 Interestingly, Lord John Browne, who served as CEO of BP from 
June 10, 1995, to May 1, 2007, released a memoir about his tenure at 
the helm of BP mere months prior to the explosion of the Deepwater 
Horizon.114  In contrast to the recent negative publicity that has 
surrounded the company, Lord Browne’s memoir is celebratory of BP’s 
progress, both in the expansion of the business throughout the world, 
as well as in its environmental record.  Organized around significant 
locations in his life, Browne’s memoir recounts his father’s career in 
the oil industry and details his own spectacular rise—as he terms it, his 
“adventure in oil”—through the corporate ranks, ultimately to become 
the head of the company.115 
 Discussing his years as CEO, Browne notes that BP was the first 
oil company to acknowledge the impact of global warming; Browne 
acknowledged the impact of carbon emissions during a speech he 
made at Stanford in 1997.116  At the time, the speech invited much 
derision from petroleum industry trade groups, but Browne notes that 
despite the criticism for taking a different line from the rest of big oil, 
he remained committed to the message that something needed to be 
                                                 
 110. Suzanne Vranica, BP Steps Up Bid To Fix Image, WALL ST. J., June 7, 2010, at 
B4. 
 111. Id. 
 112. See, e.g., LEE IACCOCA WITH WILLIAM NOVAK, IACCOCA:  AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 
(1984); JACK WELCH & JOHN A. BYRNE, JACK:  STRAIGHT FROM THE GUT (2001). 
 113. See sources cited supra note 112. 
 114. BROWNE, supra note 93, at 255-70 (providing chronology of Browne’s tenure at 
BP). 
 115. Id. at 3. 
 116. Id. at 83-84. 
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done about climate change.117  In his words, “I was the chief executive 
of an oil company and I was about to become an environmental 
activist.  The message had to be clear and there had to be no doubt that 
BP was set on creating a new future.”118  Lord Browne also describes 
BP’s charitable contributions to environmental causes.  He recounts his 
efforts to reduce carbon emissions in the extraction and refining of 
petroleum, and to investigate other forms of energy.119  Some of these 
efforts were innovative—for example, offering to plant trees to offset a 
large customer’s carbon footprint rather than a more traditional gift to 
thank them for their patronage.120  Lord Browne also notes his efforts to 
increase employee diversity at BP,121 to invest in the various communi-
ties in which BP was extracting oil, and to employ local residents 
across the world.122  He also notes his successes at achieving mergers 
with Amoco, Castol, and others, which turned BP from a fading dirty 
oil has-been to a global best-selling brand—a “supermajor”—a truly 
transnational company with a global brand. 
 By his own account, Lord Browne’s business philosophy almost 
seems to have been ripped from a textbook on corporate social 
responsibility.  Consider the following excerpt: 
During all my time with BP, there was a debate on the wider purpose of 
business. . . .  Increasing short-term profits is often thought to be the 
                                                 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 85-86 (“In little more than four years, we met our goal of reducing our 
greenhouse gas emissions by 10 per cent.  This was achieved by reducing flaring and venting 
of natural gas and improving the energy efficiency of our operations.  BP generated $650 
million of value.  It was impressive.  We had demonstrated that being environmentally 
friendly did not mean a trade-off with profitability, quite the opposite.”). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 197 (“I decided BP had to take a leadership role in diversity and inclusion.  
First, we had to ensure that we used, in so far as we could, one definition of merit.  That 
would allow us to level the playing field. . . .  Second, we changed the way we recruited and 
developed people so that wherever we were in the world we were attracting the best ones—
both women and men.  In the past our selection panels had not been diverse; white males 
were likely to recruit and promote in their own image.  Now we insisted on diverse 
memberships.  We started to recruit in every country where we operated, not just to get local 
talent but to access an international cadre of people to run our business across the world.”). 
 122. For example, Browne recounts a series of problems with BP’s operations in 
Colombia, noting: 
In Colombia we learnt that the issues of human rights, land ownership and 
environmental impact are not add-ons but integral elements which must be well 
managed to make the business sustainable over the longer term. . . .  We now 
realized we had to ensure we considered social responsibility as an integral part of 
everyday business operations. 
Id. at 102. 
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same as creating “shareholder value”. . . .  But I began to understand 
that this way of thinking erodes a commitment to the longer term.  After 
all, shareholder value is not about returns and growth rates alone; it is 
also about how long a company can keep growing. . . .  A business must 
be useful to society and be seen as such.  This approach to investment 
has commonly been called corporate social responsibility (CSR). 
 I firmly believe that a business needs a greater purpose than just 
making profits.  CSR must be integrated into its daily thinking and 
activities over a sustained period.  In BP’s case that greater purpose 
became to fulfil basic human needs:  to provide heat, light and mobility 
and to go beyond petroleum.123 
Browne notes this same corporate philosophy at various other points in 
the memoir.  For example, he states that BP “not only made good 
profits but also made the sustainable development of society, in every 
country in which it was active, an integral part of its strategy and day-
to-day business.”124  Not only was this philosophy the right way to 
operate, but according to Browne, it also provided instrumental 
benefits in the way of retaining employees.125 
 Browne also addresses the rebranding of the company as 
“Beyond Petroleum,” noting that the new advertising was 
controversial.126  As for the message that he meant to convey, Browne 
notes that the 
new helios logo and the line beyond petroleum expressed the new 
identity of the company.  It gave a strong message that BP was intent on 
becoming a new type of global energy enterprise.  We meant to tell 
people that we were ready to do more than they would expect when it 
came to confronting difficult issues, such as the conflict between 
energy and environmental needs.127 
The advertising agency that handled the BP account was bombarded 
by calls from other businesses asking them to remake their image in 
the same way that BP had, focusing on the future instead of the past.128 
 While Browne does address safety issues briefly—he mentions 
the leaking Alaska pipeline and the Texas City explosion as being low 
points for the company and his career—they are largely glossed over, 
constituting only twelve pages of an almost 300-page book.129  He 
                                                 
 123. Id. at 231-32 (citations omitted). 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 195. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 202-14. 
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traces these safety problems to the BP-Amoco merger, noting that the 
Texas City refinery was an Amoco facility that had not been fully 
integrated into BP.130  With more time and attention from BP 
management after the acquisition, he argues, these safety issues would 
not have occurred.131  Noting that BP had a “an aspiration of ‘no 
accidents, no harm to people,’” Browne does acknowledge that an 
independent panel found that BP “had not done enough to make 
process safety a core value at Texas City, or the other four US 
refineries.”132 
 Putting those problems aside, Browne had, by his own account, 
tried to change the image of BP from the top down.  In his words: 
The image of the [oil] industry was that it was old-fashioned and dirty, 
and still secretive and manipulative.  That was not the reality.  We 
wanted our image to reflect what we believed BP now stood for.  It was 
to be a competitively profitable force for good, which valued top-class 
safe operational performance, innovation, progress and environment 
leadership.133 
This was Browne’s vision of the company he had created, a vision that 
he shared with others, and a vision that others began to believe—all 
before one of the largest environmental tragedies in history occurred. 
D. Reception of the BP Advertising Campaign 
 The BP advertising campaign was wildly successful.  While the 
logic of an ecologically friendly oil company engaged in deepwater 
drilling is something of an oxymoron,134 BP’s kinder, gentler image 
touched a nerve with American consumers.  For whatever their own 
carbon footprints might be, for whatever gas-guzzling SUVs they or 
their neighbors might own, for however many trips consumers made in 
their cars, they at least aspired to be kinder to the environment.  And 
                                                 
 130. Id. at 205 (“Texas City was one of the refineries that had been part of Amoco for 
more than 70 years.  It had a proud and long history.  Its workforce felt that they were the 
heart and soul of the refinery.  But I had a sense that they felt put upon; relations were not 
good between management and the rank and file.  Changes of local leadership did little to 
improve the situation.  I suspect that some of these issues got in the way of fully integrating 
Texas City with the rest of BP.  Integration might have changed nothing but it also might have 
changed everything.”). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 194. 
 134. We note that environmental groups have been opposed to deepwater drilling, 
given the inherent environmental risks and the almost inescapable likelihood of serious 
environmental damage in the drilling process, as well as the risk of oil spills that will pollute 
the seas. 
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these consumers wanted to patronize a “green” gasoline brand, and BP 
seemed to be that brand. 
 Not only were most American consumers taken in, but so were 
legal academic commentators,135 environmentalists, and corporate 
social responsibility watchdogs.136  For example, the vice president and 
chief social investment strategist at Calvert, one of the largest socially 
responsible mutual funds in the country, noted in a media interview 
that she loved the environment and so would go out of her way to fill 
up her car at a BP gasoline station.137  To be sure, there were some 
skeptics who either seemed confused at the idea of an eco-friendly oil 
company that engaged in offshore drilling or who recalled BP’s pesky 
ongoing safety issues.138  Despite these naysayers, “Beyond Petroleum” 
was for many years an unqualified success.  As just one measure of the 
company’s success, during Lord Browne’s years as CEO, BP’s stock 
price doubled. 
 As for Browne’s memoirs, they are somewhat tainted given their 
release only months before the Deepwater Horizon disaster.  Overall, 
one might be tempted to dismiss the memoir as mere self-
congratulatory propaganda.  Despite acknowledged flaws in BP’s 
safety processes, Browne spends scant time discussing the leaking 
pipelines in Alaska or the explosion in Texas City.  Instead, he chooses 
to burnish his accomplishments, most notably the CSR mantra.  But 
                                                 
 135. See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Brown, No Good Deed Goes Unpunished:  Is There a Need 
for a Safe Harbor for Aspirational Corporate Codes of Conduct?, 26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 
367, 400 (2008) (noting BP had “higher standards” than other companies); Kevin Jackson, 
Global Corporate Governance:  Soft Law and Reputational Accountability, 35 BROOK. J. 
INT’L L. 41, 104 (2010) (listing BP along with American Apparel, Seventh Generation, 
Starbucks, Timberland, and Whole Foods as making “CSR . . . a vital component of their 
brands and their core business policies”); Pitts, supra note 8, at 334 (noting BP’s effort to “do 
good” by furnishing better stoves in India, which helped to reduce indoor air pollution and the 
rate of death in that country from lung diseases); Cynthia A. Williams, Civil Society 
Initiatives and “Soft Law” in the Oil and Gas Industry, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 457, 489 
(2004) (“Companies that are recognized as leaders in corporate social responsibility, such as 
BP . . . have adopted Codes of Conduct that do not permit paying bribes.”).  We mention these 
articles not in any way to embarrass the authors; the fact is that BP did some good things but 
it also put out misleading information and, in fact, even misled those who were well-versed in 
the literature of CSR. 
 136. For example, Julie Fox Gorte, Vice President and Chief Social Investment 
Strategist at Calvert, noted that she would go out of her way to fill up at a BP gasoline station.  
Robert Leffel & Victoria Sweeney, Doing the Right Thing:  How Ethical Leadership Can 
Enhance a Company’s Market Share, Profit, Brand Perception and Performance, ETHISPHERE, 
http://members.ethisphere.com/?doing_right_thing (last visited Feb. 27, 2011). 
 137. Id. 
 138. See, e.g., Michael R. Siebecker, Trust & Transparency:  Promoting Efficient 
Corporate Disclosure Through Fiduciary-Based Discourse, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 115, 134 
(2009) (noting that BP’s poor safety record clashed with its professed good citizen image). 
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was this ever reality?  Or, was this merely rhetoric in order to advance 
the bottom line?  Browne was certainly interested in growing the 
company; he notes that BP’s growth into a truly global company was 
one of his accomplishments.  Environmentalism and acknowledgment 
of the carbon emissions problem were perhaps means to an end—
clever ways of advancing the company’s growth while only 
undertaking change at a surface level. 
 That is one reading of the memoir.  But of course, every 
individual acts from a combination of various motivations, and perhaps 
Browne actually did believe in some of the progressive ideas that he 
espouses in his memoirs.  While it is easy to think of a corporation as a 
single entity—as indeed it is under the law—as a practical matter, 
those who cut corners out in the field and held supervisory positions 
with regard to safety issues may have been very different individuals, 
in terms of politics, values, pay, socio-economic class, and so forth, 
from those who were advocating the socially-responsible green image. 
 Browne notes that the rebranding met with some resistance and 
skepticism within the company.  Further, John Browne’s memoir 
highlights the true extent of the disconnect between what BP said it 
stood for and the company it actually was.  Reading the book, one 
would find it difficult to believe that BP, and not some other oil 
company, was responsible for the worst oil spill in US history.  The 
memoir, if nothing else, now seems downright misguided and 
misleading, as do many of BP’s advertisements.  If the public felt 
betrayed, it was because BP led people to believe that this company 
was different from other oil companies in a way that they wanted—
needed—to hear.  But it was all a glittering public relations campaign, 
not the harsh reality of BP’s short-term bottom line.  With this 
background on the myth and reality of BP, we now turn to discuss the 
corporate governance problems that led to the disaster—how they 
arose, and how they might be prevented in the future. 
IV. CORPORATE LAW’S ROLE IN THE BP OIL SPILL 
 We now explore the source of the gap between myth and reality at 
BP and by extension, other mainstream corporations.  How could Lord 
Browne pride himself on creating a green oil company amid the 
history of environmental and safety problems that presaged the Gulf 
disaster?  Perhaps corporate law and culture created and even dictated 
this disconnect.  The following sections analyze these corporate laws 
after a brief primer on CSR and the levels at which businesses may 
integrate it into their operations. 
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A. Levels of Corporate Social Responsibility 
 As Lord Browne’s memoir proudly states, CSR takes a wider 
view of a corporation’s purpose beyond profit.139  Rather, firms 
wishing to be socially responsible should strive to be “useful to 
society,” as well.140  As Lord Browne articulated it, this meant fulfilling 
society’s current energy needs (for matters such as heat, light, and 
mobility), while using its vast resources to tackle such difficult issues 
as climate change, pollution, and the development of viable 
alternatives to fossil fuels.141  More generally, CSR means managing a 
business with equal regard for financial performance, environmental 
consequences, and social impact. 
 One way of putting CSR into practice is to view these three goals 
as related bottom lines to be managed.142  That is, in addition to “the 
traditional bottom line of financial performance (most often expressed 
in terms of profits, return on investment (ROI), or shareholder value),” 
a firm should also mind its “impact on the broader economy, the 
environment, and on the society in which [it] operate[s].”143  This triple 
focus often improves firms’ financial bottom lines as much as it helps 
the environment and society.  To take one example, efforts to reduce 
manufacturing waste often result in greater efficiency and the 
discovery of innovative techniques and materials, all of which in turn 
can benefit the firm, its workforce, and the environment in both the 
short and the long runs.144 
 Firms may integrate these concepts in their operations to varying 
degrees.  At one end of the spectrum, a firm may have no ambition to 
be socially responsible and in fact be out of compliance with 
                                                 
 139. BROWNE, supra note 93, at 231-32. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. JOHN ELKINGTON, CANNIBALS WITH FORKS:  THE TRIPLE BOTTOM LINE OF 21ST 
CENTURY BUSINESS (1998). 
 143. See ANDREW W. SAVITZ WITH KARL WEBER, THE TRIPLE BOTTOM LINE:  HOW 
TODAY’S BEST-RUN COMPANIES ARE ACHIEVING ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
SUCCESS—AND HOW YOU CAN TOO, at xii (2006).  Elkington notes that, by considering 
society and the environment, the triple bottom line internalizes costs that firms would 
otherwise externalize.  ELKINGTON, supra note 142, at 92-94, 307 (discussing the “full cost 
accounting” method of “assessing the total cost of making, using, and disposing of 
products”). 
 144. ELKINGTON, supra note 142, at 314 (discussing DuPont’s successful 99% 
reduction in toxic emissions at a Texas plant—“achieved through the use of closed-loop 
recycling, off-site reclamation, selling former wastes as products, and substituting raw 
materials”—which saved “$2.5 million of capital and more than $3 million in annual 
operating costs”); SAVITZ, supra note 143 (containing numerous such anecdotes). 
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applicable labor and environmental laws and regulations.145  At this 
first type of firm, the focus is on profits to the exclusion of all other 
considerations and the firm may even deliberately violate laws in order 
to maximize corporate profits.146 
 Slightly more socially responsible is a second type of firm that 
complies with applicable laws and perhaps engages in small amounts 
of generic corporate philanthropy, but does little beyond that.147  These 
firms see “no business case” for going beyond compliance or serving 
stakeholders’ interests.148  To these firms, “the business of business is 
business” and by bare compliance (and paying taxes) they see 
themselves as fulfilling their societal obligations.149 
 A third type of firm moves beyond bare compliance but only 
does so where it would be profitable.150  These firms may view CSR 
primarily as a public relations matter, for particularly in consumer-
focused industries, social responsibility attracts customers and social 
irresponsibility repels them.151  These companies may also pursue a 
socially responsible agenda to save resources, reduce waste, achieve 
production efficiencies, and anticipate changing conditions, 
                                                 
 145. Marcel van Marrewijk & Marco Werre, Multiple Levels of Corporate 
Sustainability, 44 J. BUS. ETHICS 107, 112 (2003) (terming this level “pre corporate 
sustainability”); Kerr, supra note 9, at 857 (arranging corporate social responsibility levels 
along a spectrum).  Interestingly, Van Marrewijk and Werre derive their levels of corporate 
social responsibility from Clare Graves’s psychology research on value systems and levels of 
existence.  Van Marrewijk & Werre, supra, at 108. 
 146. On intentional noncompliance to maximize profits, see infra notes 185-188 and 
accompanying text. 
 147. See SUSTAINABILITY LTD., GEARING UP:  FROM CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY TO 
GOOD GOVERNANCE AND SCALABLE SOLUTIONS 34-37 (2004) [hereinafter GEARING UP] 
(terming this category “compliance”); Van Marrewijk & Werre, supra note 145, at 112 
(terming this category “compliance-driven” corporate sustainability); Kerr, supra note 9, at 
857 (terming this category “mere or reactive compliance”). 
 148. GEARING UP, supra note 147, at 35. 
 149. Id. (paraphrasing Milton Friedman). 
 150. Id. (labeling this type of firm a corporate social responsibility “volunteer”); Van 
Marrewijk & Werre, supra note 145, at 112 (describing this level as “profit-driven” corporate 
sustainability). 
 151. Ray Fisman et al., Corporate Social Responsibility:  Doing Well by Doing Good? 
(Sept. 2005) (unpublished manuscript) (on file at http://apps.olin.wustl.edu/jfi/pdf/ 
corporate.social.responsibility.pdf) (noting that CSR is more positively related to profitability 
in advertising-intensive, consumer-oriented industries); Janet E. Kerr, Sustainability Meets 
Profitability:  The Convenient Truth of How the Business Judgment Rule Protects a Board’s 
Decision To Engage in Social Entrepreneurship, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 623, 664-65 (2007) 
(citing studies measuring “a strong positive relationship between CSR behaviors and 
consumers’ reactions to a company’s products and services”).  This may be the case in 
business-to-business transactions, as well.  See ELKINGTON, supra note 142, at 110, 119 
(relating anecdotes). 
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regulations, and consumer preferences.152  These firms may incorporate 
environmental, ethical, and social considerations at all levels of their 
operations and decision making, but only act upon them when it would 
benefit their financial bottom line.153 
 A fourth type of firm routinely balances economic, social, and 
environmental considerations and does so not in order to comply with 
applicable laws or to make a profit.154  Rather, these firms are 
motivated to “do good”—for their various constituencies and for the 
planet—while still producing returns for their shareholders.155  These 
firms also tend to be more pro-active, partnering with government, 
“suppliers, customers, and others in their industry” to innovate 
sustainable solutions to environmental and other problems together.156 
 At the next level of CSR, firms integrate social responsibility 
principles into their strategy and business processes (starting with 
product or service development) such that the way of doing business is 
“built in, not bolted on.”157  For example, companies at this stage may 
rethink their design and production processes to reduce waste, utilize 
improved, sustainable, and even reusable materials, and in some cases 
eliminate the use of harmful materials altogether.  These firms aim to 
serve all their stakeholders, creating value for shareholders by 
matching “corporate objectives [with] wider societal challenges.”158 
 At the sixth and highest level, CSR “is fully integrated and 
embedded in every aspect of the organization, aimed at contributing to 
the quality and continuation of life of every being and entity, now and 
                                                 
 152. See Jayne W. Barnard, Corporate Boards and the New Environmentalism, 31 
WM. & MARY ENVT’L L. & POL’Y REV. 291, 291 (2007) (noting that “sophisticated corporate 
managers” are “tak[ing] into account the possibility of increased governmental regulation; the 
increasing risk of a costly response to changing environmental conditions . . . ; and growing 
consumer preference for products sold by companies that are good corporate citizens”). 
 153. Van Marrewijk & Werre, supra note 145, at 110. 
 154. GEARING UP, supra note 147, at 35 (labeling this the “partner” level); Van 
Marrewijk & Werre, supra note 145, at 112 (describing this level as “caring” corporate 
sustainability); Kerr, supra note 9, at 857-58 (labeling these firms “pro-active” in corporate 
social responsibility). 
 155. Van Marrewijk & Werre, supra note 145, at 110. 
 156. Judd F. Sneirson, Green Is Good:  Sustainability, Profitability, and a New 
Paradigm for Corporate Governance, 94 IOWA L. REV. 987, 993 (2009) (internal quotation 
marks omitted); see also Van Marrewijk & Werre, supra note 145, at 110. 
 157. See GEARING UP, supra note 147, at 36 (labeling this level “integrate”); Van 
Marrewijk & Werre, supra note 145, at 112 (describing this level as “synergistic” corporate 
sustainability); CYNTHIA A. MCEWEN & JOHN D. SCHMIDT, LEADERSHIP AND THE CORPORATE 
SUSTAINABILITY CHALLENGE 17 (2007) (“What you have to do is build responsibility into 
every aspect of the way you do business, so it’s built in, not bolted on.” (quoting a 
pharmaceutical manufacturer’s vice president of corporate responsibility)). 
 158. GEARING UP, supra note 147, at 36. 
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in the future.”159  Here, companies also redesign or “reengineer” their 
business models, financial institutions, and markets to identify and 
root out any underlying causes inconsistent with social responsibility. 
 Aside from a few outliers, however, business rarely moves 
beyond the higher levels of CSR.160  This encompasses a great deal of 
socially responsible behavior and business practices, to be sure.  
Several studies report that socially responsible business practices tend 
to be profitable,161 and the popular business press is replete with 
anecdotal evidence in further support of this hypothesis.162  In addition, 
recent work by noted financial economist Michael Jensen suggests, 
along similar lines, that managing a firm in a socially responsible way 
                                                 
 159. Id. (calling this level “reengineer”); Kerr, supra note 9, at 858 (calling this 
“creative capitalism”); Van Marrewijk & Werre, supra note 145, at 112 (terming this level 
“holistic” corporate sustainability). 
 160. See, e.g., Murray Carpenter, A Coffee Conundrum, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2010, at 
B1 (profiling Green Mountain Coffee Roasters); Cornelia Dean, Executive on a Mission:  
Saving the Planet, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2007, at F1 (profiling Ray Anderson of Interface 
Carpets); Tom Foster, Patagonia’s Founder on Why There’s “No Such Thing as 
Sustainability,” FAST COMPANY, July 1, 2009, http://www.fastcompany.com/magazine/ 
137/no-such-thing-as-sustainability.html; Sarah Lyall, Anita Roddick, Body Shop Founder, 
Dies at 64, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2007, at C11; Andrew Martin, Is a Food Revolution Now in 
Season?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2009, at BU1 (interviewing Stonyfield Farms CEO (“CE-Yo”) 
Gary Hirshberg); Booth Moore, Toms Shoes’ Model Is Sell a Pair, Give a Pair Away, L.A. 
TIMES, Apr. 19, 2009, http://www.latimes.com (enter “toms shoes model” in search box, with 
quotes); Danielle Sacks, Jeffrey Hollender:  Seventh Generation, Triple Bottom Line 
Entrepreneur, FAST COMPANY, Feb. 2, 2010, http://fastcompany.com/article/Jeffrey-hollender-
seventh-generation-triple-bottom-line-entrepreneur; Seth Goldman:  Brewing Organic Tea 
with a Mission-Based Business Model, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Dec. 23, 2008), 
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2124 (interviewing Honest Tea 
cofounder and CEO (“TeaEO”) Seth Goldman). 
 161. Joshua D. Margolis et al., Does It Pay To Be Good? A Meta-Analysis and 
Redirection of Research on the Relationship Between Corporate Social and Financial 
Performance 21 (July 26, 2007) (unpublished manuscript) (on file at http://stakeholder.bu.edu 
/2007/docs/materials.html).  The percentages do not total one hundred because thirteen 
percent of the studies did not use statistically significant sample sizes.  An earlier meta-study 
reached similar results.  Marc Orlitzky et al., Corporate Social and Financial Performance:  A 
Meta-Analysis, 24 ORG. STUD. 403, 427 (2003) (“[P]ortraying managers’ choices with respect 
to [sustainability and profitability] as an either/or trade-off is not justified in light of 30 years 
of empirical data.”).  A more recent, individual study concludes that voluntary 
overcompliance beyond applicable environmental regulations does sacrifice shareholder 
profits, albeit only very slightly.  Karen Fisher-Vanden & Karin S. Thorburn, Voluntary 
Corporate Environmental Initiatives and Shareholder Wealth 2 (CEPR Discussion Paper No. 
2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1141020 (reporting that overcompliance 
depressed firms’ stock prices by about one percent). 
 162. See, e.g., Allison Linn, Wal-Mart Aims To Cut Energy Use—and Costs, MSNBC 
(Apr. 19, 2007), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/18075223. 
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best enhances the long-term value of the firm for shareholders and 
stakeholders alike.163 
 What is more, all of these profitable, socially responsible 
business practices can together have an enormous impact.  Whether 
Wal-Mart, to take one example, is motivated by profit or by a genuine 
care for the environment, the energy it saves by implementing fuel-
conservation measures in its fleet of delivery trucks is staggering.164  
Likewise, its efforts to reduce its suppliers’ packaging waste stand to 
save both energy costs and other resource consumption at Wal-Mart 
and at other retailers, as well.165  “The company is so big, and the 
network of companies that supply its products so vast, that experts see 
the potential for Wal-Mart to have a tangible impact on problems such 
as greenhouse gas emissions.”166 
 BP stands as a depressing counterpoint to these success stories.  
On the one hand, the company expended significant effort and 
resources successfully branding itself as a kinder, gentler, and greener 
oil company, committed to taking the world “Beyond Petroleum” to 
cleaner, renewable alternative energy sources.  And the company 
appeared outwardly to be committed toward this goal, breaking from 
other oil companies on the issue of climate change, and contributing to 
environmental and other charitable causes.167  At the same time, 
however, the company flouted workplace regulations designed to 
protect employee safety, ignored environmental laws for oil and 
profit,168 and took enormous risks in deep-sea oil exploration that 
eventually led to the oil-rig explosion and ensuing spill—actions that 
proved anything but profitable.169 
 In other words, while much of BP’s rhetoric exemplified CSR, 
the reality was that BP was focused primarily on profitability.  That is, 
BP, like many companies, acted in an environmentally and socially 
responsible manner when and only when CSR helped its “green” 
image or would otherwise prove profitable.  Otherwise, when profits 
                                                 
 163. See generally Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and 
the Corporate Objective Function, 12 BUS. ETHICS Q. 235 (2002) (positing that a firm best 
maximizes its long-term value by tending to all of its stakeholder groups). 
 164. See Linn, supra note 162. 
 165. See id. 
 166. See id. 
 167. Supra notes 3, 101, 116-117 and accompanying text. 
 168. See supra Part II.B. 
 169. See supra notes 19, 70, 79 and accompanying text. 
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and public relations were not at issue, BP eschewed its stated CSR 
tenets for the traditional way of doing business.170 
B. Shareholder Primacy and Profit 
 What accounts for the stark disconnect between BP’s carefully 
cultivated green image and its business-as-usual priorities?  And why 
is CSR unable to move beyond a profit-driven level, or to instill more 
deeply committed practices and attitudes in mainstream businesses?  
The answers to both of these questions lie in the prevailing view in the 
legal academy and the business world that corporations are to be 
managed with a view toward maximizing shareholder profits. 
 This attitude—dubbed “shareholder primacy” in the academic 
literature—prioritizes shareholder interests above all other corporate 
constituencies, such as a corporation’s employees, its trade creditors, 
and the communities in which it does business.171  According to this 
view, corporate managers must make as much profit as they possibly 
can, and they may not sacrifice profits for the sake of employees or 
other nonshareholder groups.  For example, the firm should spend 
money on employee safety only to the extent necessary to comply with 
applicable laws and regulations or to the extent such expenditures are 
otherwise financially justifiable (in that they improve employee 
morale, attendance, or productivity, or that they result in lower 
insurance premiums or other corporate outlays).172 
 The most famous articulation of the shareholder primacy view 
appears in Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.173  There, John and Horace 
Dodge—then minority shareholders in the Ford Motor Company—
challenged the decision of company founder and majority shareholder 
Henry Ford to suspend the company’s practice of paying special 
                                                 
 170. What is more, by holding itself out as a level five or six company, when in reality 
it was only at level one, BP “free rode” on the CSR efforts of other firms and the public’s 
goodwill toward companies involved in socially responsible practices.  The gap that BP so 
effectively exploited—taking advantage of the public relations upside of CSR without 
actually expending the time or money to integrate or engage in it—is especially dangerous, 
because it erodes the public’s positive sentiment toward companies that genuinely engage in 
meaningful CSR. 
 171. See D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 290-
91 (1998). 
 172. Even a violation of a workplace safety law might contribute to shareholder profit 
maximization in that the amount of money saved or made may well outweigh any potential 
penalties (discounted according to the likelihood of being caught, prosecuted, and found 
liable).  See infra notes 185-188 and accompanying text. 
 173. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). 
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dividends.174  Ford instead sought to direct the firm’s resources toward 
expanding its business, lowering the price of its cars, and paying the 
company’s workers better wages.175  While these decisions seem 
reasonable enough, Ford inadvisably testified at trial that he believed 
the company made too much money and that he would prefer it to be 
less profitable.176 
 Seizing on this testimony, the Dodge brothers argued, and the 
Supreme Court of Michigan agreed, that Ford’s actions perverted the 
corporation’s shareholder-profit purpose.  The court explained: 
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the 
profit of the stockholders.  The powers of the directors are to be 
employed for that end.  The discretion of directors is to be exercised in 
the choice of means to attain that end, and does not extend to a change 
in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or to the nondistribution of 
profits among stockholders in order to devote them to other purposes.177 
While the court ultimately deferred to Ford’s business judgment, it 
ordered the company to declare a special shareholder dividend.178 
 Although subsequent courts have not relied much on Dodge’s 
authority, the case and its statement of shareholder primacy have taken 
on lives of their own in law school casebooks, in the academic 
literature, and in the minds and hearts of American businesspeople.179  
In fact, in large part due to Dodge, American corporate culture has 
embraced shareholder primacy and profit maximization as norms.180  
                                                 
 174. Id. at 671.  The company had five other shareholders in addition to Ford and the 
Dodge brothers, and had regularly paid out generous special dividends.  Id. at 670; STEPHEN 
M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS § 9.23, at 411 (2002). 
 175. Dodge, 170 N.W. at 671. 
 176. Id. at 683-84; see also Jonathan R. Macey, A Close Read of an Excellent 
Commentary on Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 177, 181-84 (2008) (suggesting that had 
Ford been less forthright on the stand, he would have easily won the case). 
 177. Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684 (“[I]t is not within the lawful powers of a board of 
directors to shape and conduct the affairs of a corporation for the merely incidental benefit of 
shareholders and for the primary purpose of benefiting others.”). 
 178. Id. at 685.  The court did not interfere with Ford’s decision to expand the 
company’s operations, however, in a straightforward application of the business judgment 
rule.  Id. at 684.  Interestingly, the Dodge brothers used this money to finance their 
eponymous competitor, Dodge Brothers Company.  See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 174, § 9.2, 
at 412 n.4 (suggesting Ford’s decision to cease special dividends “was a shrewd and ruthless 
attempt to stifle competition” and speculating that Ford did not testify as to this purpose 
because he “feared antitrust litigation” and “didn’t want to look like a robber baron”). 
 179. See Sneirson, supra note 156, at 1003-04. 
 180. Norms are “informal social regularities that individuals feel obligated to follow 
because of an internalized sense of duty, because of a fear of external non-legal sanctions, or 
both.”  Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. 
L. REV. 338, 340 (1997); LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 235 
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Thus, whether or not corporate law requires managers to maximize 
shareholder wealth, social norms induce many of them to do so, 
because that is what they learned in business school, because that is 
how they view their jobs, because they perceive that is what is 
expected of them, and because they believe—rightly or wrongly—that 
the law requires them to do so.181  Indeed, some conclude that these 
norms have “been fully internalized by American managers,”182 such 
that modern business practices could be said to follow Milton 
Friedman’s famous credo that “the social responsibility of business is 
to increase its profits.”183 
 Executive compensation, particularly when it is tied to the 
company’s stock price, may also exert pressure on corporate decision 
makers to maximize shareholder returns, especially in the short term.  
Judge Richard Posner recently argued that typical executive 
compensation packages also encourage excessive risk-taking: 
[T]he stock-option method of compensating CEOs has been found to 
induce them to take excessive risks because of the asymmetry of gain 
and loss:  there is no ceiling on the potential gain, but the loss is 
truncated at the value of the options. . . .  Another questionable 
compensation practice is giving the CEO an employment contract 
entitling him to generous severance pay, so that if he is fired he is 
                                                                                                             
(1999) (defining norms as “those normative constraints imposed not through the organized or 
centralized actions of a state, but through the many slight and sometimes forceful sanctions 
that members of a community impose on each other”); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and 
Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 914 (1996) (defining norms as “social attitudes of 
approval and disapproval, specifying what ought to be done and what ought not to be done”).  
See generally Symposium, Norms & Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1607 (2001).  
 181. See Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is To Increase Its 
Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, at 33; see also Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in 
Corporate Law:  The Role of Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 654-55 (2006) (noting 
a study finding “that the norm of shareholder wealth maximization was implicit in most 
business school courses”); Mark J. Roe, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and 
Industrial Organization, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2063, 2073 (2001) (“Norms in American business 
circles, starting with business school education, emphasize the value, appropriateness, and 
indeed the justice of maximizing shareholder wealth.”); id. at 2065 (“Shareholder wealth 
maximization is usually accepted as the appropriate goal in American business circles.”). 
 182. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Participatory Management Within a Theory of the Firm, 
21 J. CORP. L. 657, 717 (1996); Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Critical Look at Corporate 
Governance, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1263, 1288 (1992) (“Directors seem to believe that their legal 
duty is to the stockholders.”). 
 183. Fisch, supra note 181, at 655; see Smith, supra note 171, at 290-91 (“[M]anagers 
often make decisions that do not maximize value for shareholders.”); Milton Friedman, The 
Social Responsibility of Business Is To Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, 
(Magazine), at 33 (also quipping that “the business of business is business”).  Gordon Smith 
and Jill Fisch caution that the legal literature overstates this norm. 
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cushioned against loss.  This reinforces his incentive to take excessive 
risks, and at the same time signals his lack of self-confidence.184 
 This profit-maximization approach even colors executives’ views 
of the firm’s legal obligations.  While corporations and their fiduciaries 
must obey the law,185 profit-maximizing firms often consider 
compliance optional and related fines and penalties mere costs of 
doing business.186  That is, if the profit to be made by breaking a law 
outweighs the associated penalty—discounted by the likelihood the 
firm will be caught and made to pay the penalty at whatever point in 
the future—the firm should break the law to maximize shareholder 
profit.  In other words, “[t]he obligation to obey the law is subservient 
to the obligation to make money.”187  This view of “law as price” may 
help explain much of BP’s poor compliance record in its U.S. 
operations.188 
 American corporate law, both in Delaware and in other states, 
encourages this view.  Although no corporate law explicitly requires 
corporate managers to maximize shareholder wealth, the cases suggest 
as much.189  For example, under Delaware law, corporate decision 
makers may have regard for nonshareholder constituencies but any 
decisions that benefit these stakeholders must benefit the firm’s 
shareholders, as well.190  Thus, in choosing between two competing 
                                                 
 184. Richard A. Posner, Are American CEOs Overpaid, and, If So, What If Anything 
Should Be Done About It?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1013, 1026-27 (2009). 
 185. See Miller v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759, 762-63 (3d Cir. 1974). 
 186. Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523, 1524-25 (1984); 
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets of Tender Offers, 80 
MICH. L. REV. 1155, 1168 n.37 (1982); David Engel, An Approach to Corporate Social 
Responsibility, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1979).  These authors make exceptions for certain laws, 
“law[s] that prohibit[] mala in se actions, such as those constituting violence (Easterbrook 
and Fischel); actions that are deemed morally reprehensible by a clear social consensus 
(Pepper); and actions that involve criminal or moral norms (Ginsburg).”  Cynthia A. 
Williams, Corporate Compliance with the Law in the Era of Efficiency, 76 N.C. L. REV. 
1265, 1324 (1998) (referring to Stephen L. Pepper, Counseling at the Limits of the Law:  An 
Exercise in the Jurisprudence and Ethics of Lawyering, 104 YALE L.J. 1545 (1995); Smith v. 
Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., 981 F.2d 1326 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (D.H. Ginsburg, J.)). 
 187. KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW:  FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS AND 
PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES 73-74 (2006).  Greenfield argues that courts should treat 
decisions not to comply with applicable laws as ultra vires and hold decisionmakers 
personally liable to the corporation for any fees and penalties.  Id. 
 188. See supra Part II.B. 
 189. Sneirson, supra note 156, at 995-1007 (arguing that American corporate law 
contains no requirement of shareholder profit maximization). 
 190. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 
1985) (“A board may have regard for various constituencies in discharging its responsibilities, 
provided there are rationally related benefits accruing to the stockholders.”); see also eBay 
Domestic Holdings v. Newmark, No. 3705-CC, 2010 WL 3516473, at *22 (Del. Ch. Sept. 9, 
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merger partners, a board may only opt for the less generous proposal if 
it represents a better strategic combination in the long run, preserves 
valuable company culture, or similarly enhances firm value in the long 
term.191  Similarly, in making normal operational decisions, corporate 
fiduciaries may only benefit nonshareholder constituencies or the 
environment if some benefit will ultimately redound to the 
shareholders, as well. 
 American corporate law also projects this shareholder-centric 
philosophy in describing the very nature of corporate fiduciaries’ legal 
obligations.  Although corporate fiduciary duties are generally 
understood to run to the enterprise,192 many judicial opinions state 
otherwise:  “[C]orporate directors have a fiduciary duty to act in the 
best interests of the corporation’s stockholders”193 or alternatively that 
corporate fiduciaries must act in the best interests of the corporation 
and its shareholders.194  While, at least in the long run, there may not 
                                                                                                             
2010) (“Promoting, protecting, or pursuing non-stockholder considerations must lead at some 
point to value for stockholders.”).  This rule and caveat apply to normal governance issues 
under Delaware corporate law; where the company is undergoing a “change in control” or 
sale and inevitable breakup, shareholder-centric duties kick in and preclude the board from 
sacrificing shareholder interests to serve other stakeholders.  Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182. 
 Several American jurisdictions (but not Delaware) similarly restrict corporate charitable 
giving, requiring that donations benefit the firm in some way, even if the corporate benefit is 
indirect and somewhat tenuous.  See JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL., CASES & MATERIALS ON 
CORPORATIONS 39 (6th ed. 2004) (noting that seven states allow donations regardless of 
corporate benefit, nineteen states require a corporate benefit (however tenuous), and twenty-
four states (including Delaware) do not specify any such requirement).  We note, but do not 
pursue, the point because there does not seem to be a crisis of corporate giving at present. 
 191. See, e.g., In re Time Inc. Shareholder Litig., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989) 
(validating Time’s efforts to prefer Warner over Paramount as merger partners, which 
preference was ostensibly motivated to protect the “Time culture” of journalistic integrity).  
Again, this assumes Revlon duties have not been triggered.  See GREENFIELD, supra note 187. 
 192. E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, How Many Masters Can a 
Director Serve?  A Look at the Tensions Facing Constituency Directors, 63 BUS. LAW. 761, 
764 (2008) (citing N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 
101 (Del. 2007) (“It is well settled that directors owe fiduciary duties to the corporation.”), 
among other cases). 
 193. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 946 (Del. 1985) (“[O]ur 
analysis begins with the basic principle that corporate directors have a fiduciary duty to act in 
the best interests of the corporation’s stockholders.”). 
 194. Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 192, at 764 (citing a different passage in 
Gheewalla, 930 A.2d at 99 (“It is well established that the directors owe their fiduciary 
obligations to the corporation and its shareholders.”), among other cases).  For a cogent 
explanation of this inconsistency, see Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical 
Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579, 590-96 
(1992) (positing that courts speak in terms of the corporation’s best interests when resolving a 
“vertical conflict of interest” between the firm and its managers, and the shareholders’ best 
interests when resolving a “horizontal conflict of interest” between shareholders and other 
stakeholder groups). 
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even be a discernable difference between these three statements, the 
recurring message is that shareholders and their profits trump all other 
considerations.195 
 British company law takes an even stronger tack.196  Although the 
two nations’ corporate laws are very similar, shareholders in British 
companies enjoy greater power than do their American counterparts.197  
British directors as a result decidedly cater to shareholder interests.198  
British statutes reinforce this hierarchy:  while directors must consider 
nonshareholder interests in making company decisions, in the end they 
“must . . . promote the success of the company for the benefit of its 
members [that is, its shareholders] as a whole.”199 
 As a result of these directives, BP and many American companies 
engage in CSR, if at all, only at the lower CSR levels described above.  
                                                 
 195. Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization 
Norm:  A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423, 1439 (1993) (“In most 
situations, shareholder and nonshareholder constituency interests coincide.”); Smith, supra 
note 171, at 285 (“‘[T]he best interests of the corporation’ are generally understood to 
coincide with the best long-term interests of the shareholders.”); Veasey & Di Guglielmo, 
supra note 192, at 764-65 & n.9 (acknowledging that “operating a business in an 
environmentally sustainable way” may make “good business sense and therefore increase[] 
long-term financial value”). 
 196. BP is, of course, a creature of British “company law,” and thus British law 
governs its corporate governance and internal affairs.  See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 174, 
§ 1.3(A), at 14 (discussing the internal affairs doctrine). 
 197. Christopher M. Bruner, Power and Purpose in the “Anglo-American” 
Corporation, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 579, 580-82 (2010) (“Shareholders in the United Kingdom are 
. . . far more powerful, and far more central to the aims of the corporation than are 
shareholders in the United States.”).  British shareholders can unilaterally amend the 
company’s charter, pass special resolutions directing the board to act or refrain from acting in 
a certain way, remove directors, and play a commanding role in takeover attempts.  Id. 
 198. Id. at 603. 
 199. The particular provision reads: 
A director of a company must act in a way he considers, in good faith, would be 
most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members 
as a whole, and in doing so have regard (amongst other matters) to— 
(a) the likely consequences of any decision in the long term, 
(b) the interests of the company’s employees, 
(c) the need to foster the company’s business relationships with suppliers, 
customers and others, 
(d) the impact of the company’s operations on the community and the 
environment, 
(e) the desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for high standards 
of business conduct, and 
(f) the need to act fairly as between members of the company. 
Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 172(1) (U.K.); see also Bruner, supra note 197, at 607-08 
(“Ultimately, however, as a formal matter, [stakeholder] considerations are relevant only to 
the extent that they relate to the actual duty imposed on directors to make a good faith effort 
to advance the shareholders’ interests.”). 
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Only where profits may be made, either in terms of energy savings, 
waste reduction, or as a result of a benevolent corporate image, do 
socially responsible behaviors seem permissible.  And if no profit 
potential presents itself and public relations do not appear to be at 
stake, American and British corporate law seems to require a 
shareholder focus, eschewing other considerations, maximizing 
profits, and perhaps violating environmental and other laws in dogged 
pursuit of them. 
C. Moving Beyond Profit 
 One of us has argued elsewhere that American corporate law 
imposes no legal duty to manage firms in this way.200  That is, no 
corporate statute, legal rule, or controlling precedent requires 
shareholder profit maximization.201  To be sure, the Dodge case speaks 
in dicta of shareholder profit as the central purpose of the corporation, 
and three subsequent decisions contain similar expressions, also in 
dicta.202  But none of these cases stands for the legal proposition that a 
corporation must maximize shareholder profit, and in fact later 
decisions cite these cases only for other points of law.203 
 To the extent corporate law requires any shareholder focus, it 
stems from the Delaware legal principle, requiring decisions benefiting 
nonshareholder interests to benefit shareholders, and the British 
statute, requiring something similar of British company directors.204  
Perhaps then the American Law Institute’s Principles of Corporate 
Governance accurately summarizes corporate law on this point.205  
                                                 
 200. See Sneirson, supra note 156. 
 201. See id. at 995-1007. 
 202. See supra text accompanying note 177; Granada Invs., Inc. v. DWG Corp., 823 F. 
Supp. 448, 459 (N.D. Ohio 1993) (“[T]he sole duty of a corporation’s officers is to maximize 
shareholder wealth.”); Katz v. Oak Indus., Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986) (“It is the 
obligation of directors to attempt, within the law, to maximize the long-run interests of the 
corporation’s stockholders.”); Long v. Norwood Hills Corp., 380 S.W.2d 451, 454 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1964) (“[T]he ultimate object of every ordinary trading corporation is the pecuniary 
gain of its stockholders.”). 
 The recent decision in eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 3705-CC, 2010 WL 
3516473 (Del. Ch. Sept. 9, 2010), suggests something similar, also in dicta.  There, in 
invalidating the controlling shareholders’ dead-hand poison pill, the Chancery Court wrote, 
“Having chosen a for-profit corporate form, the craigslist directors are bound . . . to promote 
the value of the corporation for the benefit of its stockholders.  The ‘Inc.’ after the company 
name has to mean at least that.”  Id. at *23.  This statement is closer to the Delaware 
requirement that corporate decisions ultimately benefit the firm’s shareholders, see discussion 
supra note 190, than a requirement to maximize, as oppose to promote, shareholder welfare. 
 203. Sneirson, supra note 156, at 1003-04.  
 204. Supra notes 190, 199 and accompanying text. 
 205. AM. L. INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (1994). 
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According to the ALI, “a corporation . . . should have as its objective 
the conduct of business activities with a view to enhancing corporate 
profit and shareholder gain.”206  This “enhancing” (as opposed to 
maximizing)207 is to be over the long term,208 and firms may also pursue 
limited objectives beyond profit and shareholder gain: 
Even if corporate profit and shareholder gain are not thereby enhanced, 
the corporation, in the conduct of its business . . . [m]ay take into 
account ethical considerations that are reasonably regarded as 
appropriate to the responsible conduct of business; and . . . [m]ay 
devote a reasonable amount of resources to public welfare, 
humanitarian, educational, and philanthropic purposes.209 
 What is more, even if one accepts the view that corporate law 
requires fiduciaries to focus on shareholder wealth, the business 
judgment rule affords corporate decision makers so much latitude as to 
render any such duty unenforceable and meaningless.210  Under the 
business judgment rule, courts defer to fiduciaries’ business judgments 
as long as there is no conflict of interest present and the decision is 
reached conscientiously, on the basis of reasonably full information, 
and with a good-faith belief that the decision is in the best interests of 
the firm.211  As long as these predicates are met, company decisions, 
                                                 
 206. Id. § 2.01(a). 
 207. William W. Bratton, Confronting the Ethical Case Against the Ethical Case for 
Constituency Rights, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1449, 1456 (1993) (noting that the ALI 
eschews the term “maximization” for the more equivocal term “enhancement”). 
 208. AM. L. INST., supra note 205, § 2.01(a) cmt. f (“[E]nhancing corporate profit and 
shareholder gain . . . does not mean that the objective of the corporation must be to realize 
corporate profit and shareholder gain in the short run.”); see also id. illus. 1 & 2. 
 209. Id. § 2.01(b). 
 210. See Macey, supra note 176, at 180-81 (arguing that corporate law requires 
shareholder wealth maximization but conceding that, like the speed limit on the Merritt 
Parkway, it is not enforced because enforcement would prove to be difficult or impossible); 
Roe, supra note 181, at 2072 (noting that “corporate law’s instructions to managers” to 
enhance shareholder gain do not “determine what they do”); Smith, supra note 171, at 286 
(“[T]he business judgment rule makes the shareholder primacy norm virtually unenforceable 
against public corporations’ managers.”); see also Fisch, supra note 181, at 651 (“Although 
Dodge v. Ford is frequently cited, no modern court has struck down an operational decision 
on the ground that it favors stakeholder interests over shareholder interests.”); Thomas W. Joo, 
Race, Corporate Law, and Shareholder Value, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 351, 361 (2004) 
(“[D]irectors’ supposed duty to ‘maximize’ shareholder wealth is a toothless one.  No courts 
actually require management to maximize shareholder wealth . . . .  Indeed, such a showing 
would be all but impossible.”). 
 211. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885-86 (2d Cir. 1982) (presenting rationales for 
the business judgment rule); William T. Allen et al., Function over Form:  A Reassessment of 
Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 BUS. LAW. 1287, 1297 (2001) 
(describing the business judgment rule as “an expression of a policy of non-review of a board 
of directors’ decision”); see also BAINBRIDGE, supra note 174, § 6.2, at 242 (viewing the 
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including decisions that depart from a profit-maximizing objective, 
will always stand.212 
 Although British company law has no business judgment rule per 
se, standing rules and lenient standards of review achieve much the 
same result.  Fiduciary duties in British firms are owed to the company 
alone, and British law restricts the ability of shareholders to sue 
derivatively on the company’s behalf.213  In addition, directors’ duties to 
pursue shareholders’ interests are judged according to a subjective 
standard—whether directors have made a good faith effort to advance 
shareholder interests.214  These two features of British company law, 
like the American business judgment rule, “render it quite difficult for 
U.K. shareholders to bring suit” to challenge a decision as 
insufficiently profitable.215 
 Lastly, most American corporation codes contain provisions 
reaffirming this stance.  These “other constituency” statutes further 
protect business decisions made in the interests of the entire firm, 
typically stating that directors and officers may consider all of the 
firm’s constituencies—not just its shareholders—when determining 
what constitutes the company’s best interests.216  About two-thirds of 
these provisions are generally applicable, providing an extra measure 
of comfort where corporate managers make decisions that serve the 
                                                                                                             
business judgment rule as an abstention doctrine).  For a discussion of whether the business 
judgment rule should apply to corporate officers or just to directors, see Lyman P.Q. Johnson, 
Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule, 60 BUS. LAW. 439 (2005).  For an 
analysis of the “reasonably full information” predicate, see Sneirson, supra note 8, at 465-68 
(arguing that the duty of care’s reasonably full information component requires fiduciaries to 
assess and consider effects on the firm’s nonshareholder constituencies). 
 212. See, e.g., Joy, 692 F.2d at 880; Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 
1052 (Del. Ch. 1996); Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (upholding 
the decision not to install lights at Wrigley Field); Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 
807 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (upholding a dividend that squandered a sizable corporate tax deduction). 
 213. Bruner, supra note 197, at 609. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. The Illinois provision is typical of the American statutes.  It provides:   
In discharging the duties of their respective positions, the board of directors, 
committees of the board, individual directors and individual officers may, in 
considering the best long term and short term interests of the corporation, consider 
the effects of any action (including without limitation, action which may involve or 
relate to a change or potential change in control of the corporation) upon 
employees, suppliers and customers of the corporation or its subsidiaries, 
communities in which offices or other establishments of the corporation or its 
subsidiaries are located, and all other pertinent factors. 
805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8.85 (1983).  Most of the states that enacted these provisions did so 
during the surge of corporate-takeover activity in the 1980s, often to help local corporations 
fend off out-of-state suitors.  See Sneirson, supra note 156, at 997-98. 
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firm through its nonshareholder constituencies; the remaining third are 
limited to the takeover context and therefore only offer this statutory 
protection to a narrower class of decisions.217 
 In sum, while the law directs or at least encourages corporate 
fiduciaries to maximize shareholder wealth, it simultaneously refuses 
to enforce any such requirement.  What accounts for this major 
contradiction?218  Perhaps the shareholder wealth maximization object 
is simply official guidance meant to reinforce the profit-centered 
norm, in recognition of the business judgment rule’s inherent 
incompatibility with decisionmaking directives.219  Whatever the 
reason, corporate law perpetuates this ambivalence, lending support to 
both the view that corporations exist to serve their shareholders 
through profit maximization and the view that they may safely serve 
other constituencies as well, acting not just for shareholders but rather 
in the best interests of the entire enterprise.220 
                                                 
 217. See Sneirson, supra note 156, at 998 nn.52-53 (citing these statutes). 
 218. See William T. Allen et al., The Great Takeover Debate:  A Meditation on 
Bridging the Conceptual Divide, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1067 (2002); Christopher M. Bruner, The 
Enduring Ambivalence of Corporate Law, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1385 (2008); Lyman Johnson, The 
Delaware Judiciary and the Meaning of Corporate Life and Corporate Law, 68 TEX. L. REV. 
865, 902 (1990). 
 219. Brett McDonnell, Comment to Judd Sneirson, Shareholders Versus Stakeholders 
(May 5, 2010, 8:00 AM), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom 
/2010/05/shareholders-versus-stakeholders.html (“[Perhaps] courts put forth a norm that 
boards should maximize return to shareholders but outside a few special circumstances they 
do not enforce that norm in a way that gives rise to liability for violating it.”). 
 220. An alternative explanation for the BP oil spill places blame on BP management’s 
inability to direct its subordinates to carry out its objectives and monitor their subsequent 
actions.  Whether or not they reflect reality, Lord Browne’s legacy-creating memoir and Tony 
Hayward’s ignorance-pleading congressional testimony both support this hypothesis.  
Corporate law has traditionally viewed such director inattention as a question of the duty of 
care.  In In re Caremark, the Delaware Chancery Court set the modern standard for failure to 
monitor claims, noting the importance of “relevant and timely information” for the board of 
directors to satisfy its statutory role as the supervisor and monitor of the corporation’s 
business and affairs, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2010), and requiring boards to 
“assur[e] themselves that information and reporting systems exist in the organization [and] 
are reasonably designed to provide . . . accurate information sufficient to allow management 
. . . to reach informed judgments concerning both the corporation’s compliance [with its legal 
obligations] and its business performance.”  698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996).  For such a 
breach to be actionable, director inattention must rise to a “sustained or systematic failure of 
the board to exercise oversight.”  Id.; see also Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369-70 (Del. 
2006) (“[D]irector oversight liability [attaches when] (a) the directors utterly fail[] to 
implement any reporting or information system or controls; or (b) having implemented such a 
system or controls, [the directors] consciously fail[] to monitor or oversee its operations thus 
disabling themselves from being informed of risks or problems requiring their attention.”).  
British boards have corresponding monitoring obligations, see Brian R. Cheffins & Bernard 
S. Black, Outside Director Liability Across Countries, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1385, 1401 (2006), 
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V. SOLUTIONS:  TOWARD A SUBSTANTIVE THEORY OF 
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
 The unprecedented magnitude of the BP oil spill, the live footage 
of it incessantly spewing into the Gulf of Mexico, and the 
heartbreaking imagery of oil-soaked waterfowl have perhaps provided 
the needed motivation for the nation to rethink its energy policies and 
institute greater environmental protections.  To the extent the preceding 
parts are correct—to the extent that corporate law, no less than our 
energy priorities and environmental regulations, gave rise to the BP oil 
spill disaster—corporate law too is due for needed reform.  This Part 
proposes such reforms in an effort to transform the crisis that is the BP 
oil spill into an opportunity for lasting change.221 
A. A Cause of Action for “Greenwashing” and “Faux CSR” 
 Beyond the environmental damage, beyond the lives lost, beyond 
the ruins of the Gulf economy, there was another aspect of the oil spill 
that was especially galling to the public.  Many felt a sense of betrayal, 
because, as we have noted, there was such an extreme disconnect 
between the spill and BP’s advertising, which had portrayed the 
company as being different (read:  better) than traditional oil 
companies.  Consumers and the public therefore trusted BP and many 
went out of their way to purchase gasoline from BP when possible.222  
Socially conscious investors purchased BP stock, believing the claims 
that BP was engaged in better environmental practices than its 
competitors.  Those investor and consumer expectations were built 
through BP’s own advertising that challenged the traditional view of an 
oil company; acknowledgement of difficult environmental problems, 
most notably climate change; and the necessity of exploring forms of 
alternative fuels.223 
 To understand the sense of consumer betrayal, it may be helpful 
to offer a few comparisons.  While people might not be shocked or 
upset to find out that Kathie Lee Gifford’s clothing line was (once 
                                                                                                             
and some of the many derivative actions filed in respect of the oil spill advance such 
allegations. 
 221. Despite the common assertion, the Chinese character for “crisis” does not also 
mean “opportunity.”  See PINYIN.INFO, http://www.pinyin.info/chinese/crisis.html (last visited 
Feb. 27, 2011). 
 222. See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
 223. Others have noted that CSR involves a level of trust that is undermined when 
companies do not carry out CSR programs in the way they had ostensibly committed 
themselves to.  See, e.g., Siebecker, supra note 138. 
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again) selling items produced with child labor,224 or that Wal-Mart was 
(once again) busting unions,225 it would be a very different matter to 
discover that Ben and Jerry’s, a company that made its image on 
wholesome ingredients and progressive causes, was actually involved 
in abusing cows.226  It would also be a very different matter if 
executives at Patagonia, which has built its reputation as promoting 
conservation and stewardship of the environment, engaged in illegal 
dumping of chemicals in national forests.227  One comes to have these 
differing expectations based on the company’s past actions, but to be 
sure, much of our collective knowledge about companies and their 
actions is predicated on what a particular firm chooses to tell the 
public. 
 Over the years, activists and consumer watchdogs have noted that 
certain CSR claims were potentially subject to overstatement, inflation, 
or even outright deception.  Some environmental groups felt that the 
“green” label or “green” advertising was being used in ways that were 
either specious or misleading, by companies that had little to no 
investment in positive environmental practices.228  Colorfully, they 
termed these shallow advertising practices and misleading CSR 
statements “greenwashing.”  Increasingly, however, as many 
environmental groups benefited financially from corporate donations, 
it was the more radical groups, such as Greenpeace, who continued 
their critique of environmental CSR programs.229 
 Legal scholars who are well known for their expertise in the area 
of CSR have already noted the problems that could arise from 
greenwashing.  Given the norms surrounding short-term profit 
                                                 
 224. See, e.g., Robin Farmer, Protesters Cite Labor Practices, RICHMOND TIMES 
DISPATCH, Nov. 10, 1996, at B1 (describing labor problems with Kathy Lee Gifford’s clothing 
line as well as sweatshops used by Guess). 
 225. See Catherine L. Fisk & Michael M. Oswalt, Preemption and Civic Democracy in 
the Battle over Wal-Mart, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1502 (2008); Nelson Lichtenstein, How Wal-Mart 
Fights Unions, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1462 (2008). 
 226. See, e.g., Christopher Gergen & Stephen Martin, Social Responsibility Doesn’t 
Have To Hurt Profits, NEWS & OBSERVER, Aug. 15, 2010, http://www.newsobserver.com/ 
2010/08/15/628275/social_doesnt_have.html (“Ben and Jerry’s became a poster-child for the 
movement when it promised 7.5 percent of pre-tax profits to help causes such as preserving 
the Amazonian rain forest.”). 
 227. See, e.g., L.D. Porter, Eco-Fashion Takes the Runway, SANTA BARBARA INDEP., 
Apr. 29, 2010, at 25 (quoting the company’s mission statement:  “Build the best product, 
cause no unnecessary harm, use business to inspire and implement solutions to the 
environmental crisis”). 
 228. Cf. Wright, supra note 5. 
 229. See, e.g., John Vidal, Artists Prepare for BP Protest at Tate Britain, GUARDIAN 
U.K., June 25, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 12736937. 
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maximization, companies have an incentive to promise consumers 
“eco-friendly” products, but then deliver goods or services in the 
cheapest way possible, regardless of environmental impact.  While that 
may be an extreme or blatant scenario, the incentive to shirk duties 
described in advertising to an uncertain constituency outside the 
company (the environment) is unfortunately present.  Indeed, because 
of these issues, there have been calls for both more disclosure of the 
true state of a company’s environmental record and for the creation of 
a remedy for fraudulent or misleading claims of CSR. 
 Approximately ten years ago, Professor Cynthia Williams wrote 
an article in the Harvard Law Review, arguing that the SEC should 
require accurate and standardized disclosure of environmental 
information from publicly-traded companies.230  More recently, 
Professor Michael Siebecker noted that, much as it is difficult to test 
the truth of CSR advertising, commercials and the social responsibility 
reports that some companies have issued could mislead investors.231  
And in a recent article that appeared two years ago, Professor Janet 
Kerr began sketching some preliminary contours of what an action 
under 10b-5 for what we term “faux CSR” might look like.232 
 While creative, the law review literature to date has largely 
described these issues only in the abstract.  In addition, scant attention 
seems to have been devoted to this type of action for faux CSR in 
reported case law, although we will describe the few extant cases in 
detail, below.  Because these legal theories regarding faux CSR and 
greenwashing are still novel, and because they may prompt a move 
toward a more substantive theory of CSR, thorough analysis of these 
issues is needed.  Here, we find that the BP case study is a useful 
                                                 
 230. Williams, supra note 9, at 1293-1306 (proposing that SEC mandate disclosure of 
environmental information, thus providing a check against inflated advertising claims). 
 231. Siebecker, supra note 9. 
 232. Kerr, supra note 9.  Some of Professor Kerr’s other proposals are far more radical.  
For example, in a 2009 article, she argues that the government might want to choose to 
mandate CSR in some instances, for example when a multinational corporation engages in 
various functions in a third-world country that make it more akin to a government than a 
corporation.  Janet E. Kerr, A New Era of Responsibility:  A Modern American Mandate for 
Corporate Social Responsibility, 78 U. MO. KAN. CITY L. REV. 327 (2009); see also David 
Monsma & John Buckley, Non-Financial Corporate Performance:  The Material Edges of 
Social and Environmental Disclosure, 11 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 151 (2004) (arguing that 
corporate statements about the extent of their CSR programs could in some instances be 
material).  Other commentators have noted that corporate “codes of ethics” could also 
potentially be subject to liability as a form of false advertising if the company’s executives fail 
to comply with the codes.  See, e.g., Su-Ping Lu, Note, Corporate Codes of Conduct and the 
FTC:  Advancing Human Rights Through Deceptive Advertising Law, 38 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 603 (2000). 
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example for application of some of the ideas that have been set out 
before only theoretically. 
 Therefore, if a company advertises its record on CSR, 
highlighting an aspect or element of the company that is progressive, 
but downplaying a portion of the record that is anything but 
responsible, such as BP’s pipeline accidents and refinery explosions, 
could that company be held legally liable for misleading consumers or 
investors?  We propose several solutions, based on the constituency 
involved:  that of false advertising (for consumers) and that of 
securities fraud (for investors).  We then go on to discuss whether there 
may be a remedy to be found in newly enacted legislation present in 
the Dodd-Frank Act, which created a separate federal administrative 
agency to assist consumers with their investments, the Bureau of 
Consumer Financial Protection.  We examine each of these possible 
causes of action in more depth, but the point is the same:  CSR, to be 
meaningful, must be both genuine and substantive; some methods of 
policing claims of CSR are needed to protect the accuracy of 
information in the securities markets. 
1. False Advertising 
 Were consumers led astray by BP’s various commercials, print 
advertisements, and other materials that emphasized the company’s 
ostensibly positive environmental reputation?  In some ways this claim 
is slightly different from a typical “false advertising” claim about a 
good or service.  For tangible goods, a positive reputation may be one 
that emphasizes durability, good value, functional design, or quality 
craftsmanship.  For services, this may encompass efficiency, 
innovation, good ethics, or timeliness.  In the instance of promoting a 
product that is essentially fungible—every gallon of gas is 
fundamentally interchangeable—one would not normally think about 
environmental impact as being a price differentiator. 
 That, however, was the genius of the “Beyond Petroleum” 
campaign; a particular brand of gasoline was sold based on a 
consumer preference for an environmentally friendly energy company.  
Regardless of whether this was an oxymoron, a fundamental 
incompatibility, or proof that the American public is willing to delude 
itself, the point is that it worked; BP spent $200 million on its 
advertising campaign in order to promote this very idea.  In some 
sense, BP was selling its green image as much as it was selling its 
gasoline.  It was more than a press release or even a mere advertising 
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campaign; as described above, it was a key part of their corporate 
strategy, identity, and branding. 
 While reported cases based on a theory of faux CSR are difficult 
to find, there have been some cases of false advertising brought in 
regard to specific products, mostly goods that used particular product 
labeling that asserted the good was “green.”  As noted by two 
commentators, there have been some successful claims in which 
insecticide companies labeled their products as safe or 
environmentally friendly, when they were not.233  In addition, cases 
have also been brought based on the use of the word “recycled,” 
“recyclable,” or “biodegradable,” all of which now have strict legal 
definitions.234  Although these cases dealt with false representation 
claims concerning product labeling, the claim of false advertising 
around an environmental claim could be seen as analogous. 
 The most well-known claim of false advertising around a claim 
related to CSR is the California Supreme Court decision in Nike v. 
Kasky.235  In this case, which generated a good deal of attention—at 
one point the Supreme Court of the United States was to review the 
case before certiorari was ultimately withdrawn—the issue of 
corporate free speech conflicted with claims of labor abuses.  In brief, 
media reports and press releases by various labor watchdogs asserted 
that Nike had violated various labor rights norms in the manufacture of 
its apparel, including violating minimum wage laws in various Asian 
countries, as well as subjecting workers to harassment and toxic 
substances.236  In response to these assertions, Nike denied that the 
problems existed.237  Plaintiffs brought an action under California’s 
false advertising law against Nike for making these assertions, and the 
lower courts had summarily dismissed their actions on free speech 
grounds.238 
 Holding that Nike’s assertions were commercial speech and thus 
subject to a lower level of constitutional protection, the California 
Supreme Court remanded the case for further factual findings to see if 
Nike’s statements were, indeed, false.239  As the Nike court stated: 
                                                 
 233. Branson, supra note 8, at 646 (citing cases); John M. Church, A Market Solution 
to Green Marketing:  Some Lessons from the Economics of Information, 79 MINN. L. REV. 
245, 301-04 (1994) (same). 
 234. Church, supra note 233, at 279-83. 
 235. 45 P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002), cert. granted, 539 U.S. 654 (2003). 
 236. Id. at 247-48. 
 237. Id. at 248. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. at 262. 
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Our holding, based on decisions of the United States Supreme Court, in 
no way prohibits any business enterprise from speaking out on issues of 
public importance or from vigorously defending its own labor practices.  
It means only that when a business enterprise, to promote and defend its 
sales and profits, makes factual representations about its own products 
or its own operations, it must speak truthfully.240 
The case later settled out of court with Nike’s promising to fix various 
issues, subject itself to third-party monitoring, and make a monetary 
payment to a worker’s advocacy nonprofit group.  While many 
commentators have discussed Nike as a promising avenue to keep 
corporations to their word regarding worker rights, it is more 
tantalizing than fulfilling, as the issue itself was never litigated and the 
Supreme Court of the United States never heard the case.241 
 With that said, the issue is likely an open one; but if “green” 
claims were a significant part of a company’s consumer marketing, 
and consumers did, indeed, rely on the false statements, the 
corporation’s claims would not be entitled to an absolute First 
Amendment free speech defense; instead they would only be accorded 
the (lesser) deference afforded to commercial speech.  State 
governments retain the right to regulate commercial speech that is 
false or misleading, and this could pave the way for actions based on a 
claim of greenwashing or faux CSR. 
2. Securities Fraud 
 Would investors who chose to put their money in BP stock, rather 
than another firm, be able to bring a cause of action for securities fraud 
on the basis of BP’s misleading advertising campaign?  We believe that 
the answer to this question should be “yes,” and we believe that 
allowing such a claim to proceed would increase the overall accuracy 
of information available about CSR. 
                                                 
 240. Id. at 247. 
 241. For a sampling of commentary about the impact of Nike, see, for example, 
Robert L. Kerr, From Sullivan to Nike:  Will the Noble Purpose of the Landmark Free Speech 
Case Be Subverted To Immunize False Advertising, 9 COMM. L. & POL’Y 525 (2004); Tamara 
R. Piety, Grounding Nike:  Exposing Nike’s Quest for a Constitutional Right To Lie, 78 TEMP. 
L. REV. 151 (2005); Michele Sutton, Between a Rock and a Judicial Hard Place:  Corporate 
Social Responsibility Reporting and Potential Legal Liability Under Kasky v. Nike, 72 U. 
MO. KAN. CITY L. REV. 1159 (2004); Samuel A. Terilli, Nike v. Kasky and the Running-but-
Going-Nowhere Commercial Speech Debate, 10 COMM. L. & POL’Y 383 (2005); David C. 
Vladeck, Lessons from a Story Untold:  Nike v. Kasky Reconsidered, 54 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 1049 (2004). 
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 Securities fraud under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 requires that 
a plaintiff show a material misstatement or actionable omission of fact, 
made with scienter, on which another justifiably relies, causing 
damages.242  Securities fraud additionally requires that the fraud be “in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security” per the statute;243 
if the security is traded on an efficient market such as the New York 
Stock Exchange, reliance can be presumed under the “fraud-on-the-
market theory”;244 and, regarding causation, the plaintiff must show 
both that the misstatement or omission caused the purchase or sale 
(transaction causation) and that the misstatement or omission caused 
the complained-of loss (loss causation).245 
 A United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit case raises 
the key obstacle that plaintiffs will likely face in bringing an action for 
CSR fraud under the securities laws:  showing materiality.246  In the 
Sixth Circuit case, Ford was charged with securities fraud for its 
statements regarding the safety of the tires installed on the Ford 
Explorer.247  Plaintiffs noted that they were in part suing Ford for 
representing itself as a socially responsible company while marketing 
products that were dangerous.248  The court there dismissed the claim, 
stating the following about Ford’s claim that it was “going to lead in 
corporate social responsibility”: 
Such statements are either mere corporate puffery or hyperbole that a 
reasonable investor would not view as significantly changing the 
general gist of available information, and thus, are not material, even if 
they were misleading.  All public companies praise their products and 
their objectives.  Courts everywhere “have demonstrated a willingness 
to find immaterial as a matter of law a certain kind of rosy affirmation 
commonly heard from corporate managers and numbingly familiar to 
the marketplace—loosely optimistic statements that are so vague, so 
lacking in specificity, or so clearly constituting the opinions of the 
                                                 
 242. Compare W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 
§ 105 (5th ed. 1984) (common law fraud), with Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 
(1988) (fraud action under section 10B and Rule 10b-5), and Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 
544 U.S. 336, 341-42 (2005) (same). 
 243. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006). 
 244. Basic, 485 U.S. at 241-48. 
 245. Dura Pharm., 544 U.S. at 341-42 (distinguishing between transaction and loss 
causation). 
 246. In re Ford Motor Co., 381 F.3d 563, 570-71 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Monsma & 
Buckley, supra note 232; Kerr, supra note 9, at 857. 
 247. Ford, 381 F.3d at 570-71. 
 248. Id. at 570. 
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speaker, that no reasonable investor could find them important to the 
total mix of information available.”249 
And, indeed, one of the concerns or problems that investors bringing 
an action against a company like BP might face is that it might be 
difficult to point to one fact specifically identified as false, or, even if 
that were easy to prove, that the statement was material.250 
 However, as socially conscious investing increases in volume and 
popularity, the materiality hurdle may not seem so insurmountable.251  
As two commentators noted, a  
large institutional investor or a class of socially responsible mutual 
funds may have a more objective basis for relying on non-financial 
company statements, policies, and practices.  In other words, once a 
company states a position on climate change or child labor, there is no 
going backwards in the marketplace without first retracting or re-
establishing performance expectations once they are made.252 
Such funds explicitly make their investment decisions based on the 
triple bottom line.  In light of these investment criteria, it becomes 
difficult to say that CSR would be anything else other than material to 
the investment decision. 
 As the BP oil spill demonstrates, it should be possible for a 
plaintiff to show both transaction and loss causation to support a 
securities fraud claim for false CSR representations.  An investor who 
chose BP stock on the strength of its carefully cultivated green 
reputation should be able show transaction causation.  The 
representations also relate to BP’s stock performance following the 
spill, in recognition of the company’s massive exposure for the 
environmental and economic damage it caused to the Gulf and 
regional economy.  Thus, loss causation also seems to be present.  The 
same showing could not be so easily made on less compelling facts; 
where an investor is merely duped by greenwashing claims but no 
related damages result, loss causation would be absent and thus the 
claim for CSR fraud would likely fail. 
                                                 
 249. Id. at 570-71 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 250. On puffery generally, see David A. Hoffman, The Best Puffery Article Ever, 91 
IOWA L. REV. 1395 (2006). 
 251. See George Djurasovic, The Regulation of Socially Responsible Mutual Funds, 
22 J. CORP. L. 257 (1997). 
 252. Monsma & Buckley, supra note 232. 
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3. The Dodd-Frank Act and the Bureau of Consumer Financial 
Protection 
 While these theories under either false advertising or Rule 10b-5 
could be helpful in analyzing liability for faux CSR, there is another 
possibility for policing CSR claims on the horizon.  In July of 2010, 
Congress passed a historic financial reform bill, known as the Dodd-
Frank Act after its sponsors.253  Running to over 840 printed pages, the 
Dodd-Frank Act covers matters as diverse as the regulation of the 
banking system, executive compensation, and the regulation of 
derivative swaps.  One of the portions of the Dodd-Frank that will 
likely have a large impact on consumers is the establishment of the 
Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection.  Harvard Law School 
Professor Elizabeth Warren was a critical figure in shaping the course 
of the legislation and establishing the need for additional consumer 
protection in response to the credit meltdown and the series of bailouts 
in 2008.254  Section 1011 of the Dodd-Frank Act sets out the enabling 
legislation for the establishment of the Bureau, which is to “regulate 
the offering and provision of consumer financial products or services 
under the Federal consumer financial laws.”255 
 Other subsequent sections describe the Bureau’s mission to 
increase the provision of financial services in underserved 
neighborhoods,256 establish an Office of Fair Lending and Equal 
Opportunity,257 establish an Office of Financial Education, and 
“develop and implement a strategy to improve the financial literacy of 
consumers.”258  Two of the Bureau’s enumerated objectives are to 
ensure that consumers are “provided with timely and understandable 
information to make responsible decisions about financial 
transactions” and that consumers are “protected from unfair, deceptive, 
                                                 
 253. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1964 (2010); see also Hal S. Scott, The Reduction of Systemic Risk in 
the United States Financial System, 33 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 671 (2010) (discussing 
proposed legislation that became the Dodd-Frank Act). 
 254. Jonathan Alter, Pick Elizabeth Warren, Obama Should Relish the Fight, 
NEWSWEEK, Aug. 9, 2010, http://www.newsweek.com/2010/08/01/pick-elizabeth-
warren.html (advocating for Professor Warren’s appointment to head the agency she lobbied 
to create); Harold Meyerson, Jobs in the Cards?, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 2010, at A17 (same); 
Damian Paletta, Consumer-Czar Candidate Waits in Wings, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 2010, at A4. 
 255. Pub. L. No. 111-203, tit. X, § 1011, 120 Stat. at 1964. 
 256. Id. § 1013(b)(2) (Community Affairs Office). 
 257. Id. § 1013(c). 
 258. Id. § 1013(d).  There is also provision for an Office of Service Member Affairs, 
section 1013(e), as well as one for older Americans.  Id. § 1013(g). 
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or abusive acts and practices and from discrimination.”259  The Bureau 
will be primarily concerned with researching and policing consumer 
credit agreements, loans, mortgages, and other financial instruments 
that can often be incredibly confusing to consumers. 
 At the same time, the language in the statute concerning 
consumer education, appropriate disclosure, and tracking of consumer 
complaints could overlap with the area of “faux CSR” or 
“greenwashing,” as these are consumer information issues and 
accurate disclosure could certainly influence a consumer’s informed 
investment decision.  Further, in the process of providing consumers 
with education and knowledge about their rights, it would be wise to 
help consumers understand whether a purchase (for altruistic reasons) 
is actually going to advance the cause that they believe in, and that can 
only be done through accurate disclosure of information.  Because the 
legislation and the Bureau are so new, it is difficult to know how 
various provisions will be enforced or what litigation will be brought.  
That said, it is intriguing to think about the possibility that accurate 
CSR information could be one aspect of consumer fraud that might 
receive attention from the new agency. 
4. A Private Certification Model 
 Alternatively or in conjunction with the avenues described above, 
private mechanisms can also serve to police corporate claims of social 
responsibility.  Before the U.S. Department of Agriculture organic 
label was introduced, private organizations such as Quality Assurance 
International played a central role in certifying organic food claims.260  
Organic food purveyors would contact one of these certifiers who 
would then inspect and verify any organic food claims according to 
each organization’s specific standards.  In 2002, the U.S.D.A. 
developed uniform standards for organic food and empowered these 
organizations (and state departments of agriculture) to certify and label 
products as U.S.D.A. organic.261 
 The organic food example suggests two additional models for 
policing CSR claims.  Private organizations could develop marks and 
                                                 
 259. Id. § 1021(b). 
 260. See QUALITY ASSURANCE INTERNATIONAL, http://www.qai-inc.com (last visited 
Feb. 27, 2011); OREGON TILTH, http://tilth.org/about (last visited Feb. 27, 2011). 
 261. See Federal Organic Foods Production Act of 1990, 7 U.S.C. §§ 6503-6504 
(2006); 7 C.F.R. §§ 205.1-205.690.  Similar private certification systems exist for kosher food 
and for green “LEED certified” buildings.  See, e.g., OUKOSHER, http://www.oukosher.org 
(describing the O-U hechsher and mark); U.S. GREEN BUILDING COUNCIL, http://www. 
usgbc.org/leed (last visited Feb. 27, 2011) (describing the LEED building designations). 
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license corporations to use them upon verification of any social 
responsibility claims.  In fact, B Labs, the owner of the “B 
Corporation” mark, already offers a similar service, certifying and 
licensing corporations that adhere to its standard of benevolence.262  
Alternatively, the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection or another 
federal agency could develop uniform CSR standards, as was done 
with organic food, and designate private organizations to verify 
compliance with them.  Or perhaps, the Bureau could allow private 
entities to do this verification on their own, but audit any such 
certification-providers so as to ensure they are not subject to bribery or 
manipulation.  Such monitoring or other certification could alleviate 
“greenwashing” concerns about companies claiming to be socially 
responsible but doing little beyond clever marketing. 
5. Counterarguments and Rebuttal 
 We anticipate that some of our proposals will have their critics, 
especially in light of the fact that these are novel legal theories as 
applied to CSR.  From the right, the critique would likely concern 
expanded liability and an increased cost to businesses associated with 
compliance.  While we understand the hesitation to expand liability, in 
our minds it is outweighed by the competing importance of market 
efficiency.  In a securities market crowded with meaningless 
greenwashing “noise,” it becomes difficult for investors to receive 
accurate information about CSR and for arbitrageurs to trade and have 
the market self-correct.  To the extent that regulation in and of itself is 
a concern, there is also the option of leaving more of the policing to 
private certification organizations. 
 From the left, the critique might be that our proposals have not 
gone far enough to regulate, or even in some instances, mandate, 
particular standards for CSR.263  Further, some would say that our 
proposals put too much faith in individual consumer and investor 
choice.  To this we would respond that here we are concerned with the 
value of transparency to investors and consumers.  While investors and 
consumers retain the ability to invest and spend as they wish, they also 
deserve the right to be accurately informed about CSR-related matters 
in addition to the financial bottom line. 
 We also believe there may be an argument—from those 
sympathetic to CSR regardless of ideological position—that the 
                                                 
 262. Sneirson, supra note 156, at 1017-19. 
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proposals might deter some amount of CSR from those firms on the 
margin.  As CSR is a voluntary endeavor, the argument would be that 
liability for misstatements or the additional costs of certification could 
discourage some number of firms from implementing CSR 
programs.264 
 While in general we would not wish to deter companies from 
becoming more socially responsible, at the same time we also have to 
acknowledge the seriousness of greenwashing.  In fact, we would go 
so far as to argue that if greenwashing goes unchecked, the CSR 
project will be fatally undermined.  Without some form of verification, 
the “free riders” who take advantage of CSR will result in a public 
weary of hearing about CSR and skeptical of or even cynical about its 
benefits.  As Professors Conley and Williams have noted, faux CSR 
may be worse than no CSR, as faux CSR “may be even worse than 
business as usual, as the effect of the rituals may be to co-opt critics, 
mislead consumers, and preempt regulation.”265  Or, as Professor 
Siebecker wrote: 
[A]bsent trustworthy auditing processes, enforcement mechanisms, or 
robust disclosure requirements that ensure full transparency, it becomes 
difficult for consumers and investors to detect when a company in fact 
adopts a defective posture.  What results is true economic waste—a 
destruction of the market for good CSR practices, because consumers 
and investors will not be willing to pay a premium for CSR practices, 
unless they can rely on the accuracy of a corporation’s statements.266 
Therefore, despite understanding the hesitancy to hold corporations 
accountable or liable for statements that may, in some instances, be 
merely aspirational, if this information is being relied on by consumers 
and investors, they do have the right to full information.  Surely those 
who drove out of their way to fill up at BP because of its advertising or 
find themselves with BP stock in their portfolio because they thought 
                                                 
 264. Brown, supra note 135, at 374: 
The solution that this Article will consider is for the states or the federal 
government or both to adopt laws that would grant corporations who adopt 
aspirational codes of conduct a safe harbor from litigation that might be brought if 
they fail to meet the higher standards set forth in their codes.  Corporations would 
only be entitled to these safe harbors as long as they adopted and monitored the 
implementation of such codes in good faith. 
 265. John M. Conley & Cynthia A. Williams, Engage, Embed, and Embellish:  Theory 
Versus Practice in the Corporate Social Responsibility Movement, 31 J. CORP. L. 1, 14-15 
(2005). 
 266. Siebecker, supra note 138, at 118-19. 
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it was an environmentally friendly company would have liked to have 
had more complete information, rather than corporate blandishments. 
 The final criticism is that none of our proposed solutions, 
standing in isolation, will remove all of the faux CSR from the market.  
While we acknowledge that the false advertising and securities fraud 
solutions do not completely map to CSR, given that these causes of 
action were originally shaped to remedy other concerns, they at least 
provide good starting points for eliminating the worst or most 
egregious instances of faux CSR. 
B. Reforming Profit Maximization 
 A final set of suggestions involves corporate law’s focus on 
shareholder profits.  As the preceding sections show, corporate law 
provisions requiring a shareholder focus in everyday decisionmaking 
go largely unenforced and serve little purpose beyond perpetuating the 
shareholder maximization norm and stifling CSR.267  What is more, 
this singular focus may even disserve the very shareholders it is meant 
to benefit if recent financial scholarship is correct that a broader, 
longer-term view is what best enhances firm value.268 
 To the extent that nothing requires corporate fiduciaries to 
maximize shareholder returns, no concrete corporate law reforms need 
be undertaken.  Perhaps all that is necessary is a greater awareness 
among academicians, lawyers, and businesspeople that firms may 
heartily integrate socially responsible principles and practices without 
breaching any duty, without disappointing shareholders over the long 
term, and without violating modern social norms. 
 Those firms wishing to do so may of course continue to pursue 
shareholder profits to the exclusion of other constituencies’ interests, 
but they must obey applicable laws and regulations in the process.  In 
other words, we must abandon the law-as-price view of compliance 
with corporate legal obligations, such that corporations uninterested in 
social responsibility at least rise to the level of bare compliance.  
Others have analyzed the issue in more depth than we do here, and we 
refer to and endorse their proposals here.269 
                                                 
 267. See supra Part IV.C. 
 268. See discussion supra note 151 and accompanying text. 
 269. See, e.g., GREENFIELD, supra note 187, at 73 (viewing noncompliance with legal 
obligations as ultra vires actions); Williams, supra note 186, at 1385 (arguing that firms 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 Over the next decade, as the environmental effects of the BP oil 
spill finally fade into history,270 will business continue as before, its 
profit focus unchanged and its commitment to CSR still little more 
than a cheap-talk marketing gimmick?271  We hope not; we hope that 
one positive result from the disaster will be lasting changes to 
corporate law and practice encouraging firms to engage in genuine, 
more substantive forms of CSR.  These changes may be as simple as 
widespread recognition that corporate fiduciaries need not focus on 
shareholder profits to the exclusion of all other considerations and 
meaningful enforcement of labor and environmental laws.  And as the 
BP case study demonstrates, true change must coincide with some 
means of substantiating corporate claims of social responsibility.  
Traditional avenues of false advertising and securities fraud can serve 
this purpose, as can elements of the Dodd-Frank Act, either in 
conjunction with or separately from the actions of private certification 
organizations.  We hope that these proposals are able to effect real 
change, instilling greater social responsibility in Anglo-American 
businesses and allowing them to move themselves “beyond profit.” 
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